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Abstract 
The terrorist attacks on the United States in September of 2001 had a deep impact on the 
world. In the aftermath of the attacks strong discursive and legislative measures were taken 
against terrorism. One of these measures was to proscribe some armed groups on so-called 
terrorist lists, with subsequent sanctions inflicted on these groups. In this thesis I aim to 
understand the impact the mechanism of proscription can have on a peace process where one 
of the parties in the process is proscribed on one or more of these lists. 
To further my understanding of this impact I have chosen to analyze the case of the 5
th 
Sri Lankan peace process. The armed group the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) 
were engaged in a decades-long conflict with the Sri Lankan state with the goal of creating 
their own state for the Tamil people of Sri Lanka. The LTTE and the government of Sri Lanka 
became involved in a peace process lasting from the late 1990s until the destruction of the 
LTTE in 2009, with the formal talks of the process occuring in 2002-2003. This process was 
facilitated by Norway, in addition to other less involved international stake-holders. 
In the thesis I analyze the impact the terrorist proscriptions of the LTTE had on the 
peace process, and to what degree this impact can help explain the failure of the process. It is 
important to understand the consequences of the proscriptions, as my analysis indicates that 
the proscriptions of the LTTE were partially to blame for the failure of the process. The 
proscriptions prevented contact between crucial actors such as the US and the EU to the 
LTTE, in addition to decreasing the levels of trust in the process. This reduced the ability of 
the third-party actors to affect the strategic calculations of the LTTE and move the group 
away from using violent means. The proscriptions thus seem to have had a negative effect on 
the framework for the peace process. 
In addition to the effect on the framework of the process, I analyzed whether the 
threaths and promises of proscription and de-proscription were effective in altering the 
incentive-structure of the LTTE. My analysis found that the promise of de-proscription from 
the Sri Lankan government was effective in getting the LTTE to hold formal talks. The 
international actors‘ threaths and promises on the other hand were ineffective in their aim of 
moving the LTTE away from violent means. The proscriptions were thus found to have had a 
negative impact on the peace process, with no real positive effect to compensate for this. 
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1  Introduction 
The world has changed significantly in many ways since the attacks on US soil on 
September 11
th
 2001. In the chaotic circumstances that followed the attacks a 
discursive as well as legislative global wave surged against the ‗terrorists‘. In the 
undertow of this wave there were several armed groups that became proscribed as 
terrorist organizations on the terrorist lists that were created or added to around the 
world. I believe something concerning these lists has been overlooked by the ones who 
use the mechanism. That is the potential negative effect the mechanism of terrorist 
proscription can have had on the ability for third-party actors to engage as mediators in 
conflicts where a part has been proscribed as terrorists. What I therefore aim to 
understand in this thesis are the consequences this proscription mechanism has had and 
might have on the ability to reach a peaceful, negotiated conclusion in a peace process 
where one of the parties is proscribed on one or several of these terrorist lists.  
To further my understanding of this potential effect I analyze a single case in-
depth. One of the processes where this mechanism could have had an effect is on the 
5
th
 peace process in Sri Lanka. This process began after several decades of low-
intensity conflict and outbreaks of civil war between the Sri Lankan government and 
the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). Norway led this peace engagement 
between 1997 and 2009, attempting to facilitate a peaceful conclusion to the conflict. 
The process ended in ignominy as the negotiations broke down and the Sri Lankan 
army destroyed the LTTE, resulting in large civilian casualties. I examine this peace 
process to understand whether the proscriptions of the LTTE as a terrorist group might 
have influenced the course and outcome of the peace process, and if it did, in what 
way. This peace process is suitable as my case given the research question, as one of 
its parties was proscribed by several actors, the process failed, and a number of 
Norwegians participated and therefore have much insight into it. My research design is 
not very apt for generalizing my findings and I have no particular ambition of doing 
this either. Still, as the number of conflicts where one of the parties is proscribed as 
terrorists are likely to increase in the foreseeable future, more knowledge of the effects 
of this mechanism is highly salient.    
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 Research Question 1.1
My research question reads as follows: To what degree can the impact of the terrorist 
proscriptions of the LTTE help explain the failure of the 5
th
 peace process in Sri 
Lanka? 
As the 5
th
 peace process on Sri Lanka ended up failing, it will be interesting and 
helpful for future policy decisions to understand the impact the terrorist proscriptions 
had on the process. Did the process fail, in part or fully, due to the impact of the 
proscriptions of the LTTE? Even if the proscriptions are shown not to have a 
significant effect on the process, this would be an equally interesting discovery in my 
opinion. The phrasing in the research question of ―to what degree‖ indicates that the 
answer of the proscriptions‘ impact is likely to be a nuanced one rather than a yes or 
no answer. There is simply not enough knowledge about the mechanism of 
proscriptions at the present time for states and organizations to use it without 
hesitation, especially when one considers the potentially extreme consequences failed 
peace processes can have. 
 
 Analytical Approach 1.2
My analytical approach consists of two theoretical contributions used in concord to 
create a broad approach. Therefore my thesis will hopefully yield greater analytical 
insights than a narrow approach would. The two theoretical contributions I use are 
developed by Sophie Haspeslagh and Jon Hovi. 
Sophie Haspeslagh presents a framework where the impact of terrorist 
proscriptions on the efforts of third-parties in a peace process can be analyzed (2013). 
The framework indicates that the proscriptions decrease the levels of access and trust 
between the actors of the process, which in turn makes it harder for third-parties to 
engage with the armed group. There are four roles the third-parties could play 
constructively in a peace process that are affected negatively by the proscriptions. I 
return to this with a much more thorough presentation of the four roles and the way 
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they are thought to be affected by the proscriptions in chapter 3. Then I shall analyze 
the impact of the proscriptions on the ability of third-parties to play these roles on Sri 
Lanka in chapter 5.  
Jon Hovi created the theoretical contribution that constitutes the second part of 
my analytical framework. He has outlined five conditions that need to be fulfilled for a 
threat to be effective (Hovi, 1998). The five conditions are: relevance, severity, 
credibility, completeness, and clarity. I argue that the threat of proscription and the 
promise of de-proscription are suitable for analysis through this framework. This way, 
one can analyze the effectiveness of the proscriptions as a mechanism for altering the 
incentive-structure of the LTTE towards a peaceful path during the peace process. If 
the threats and promises surrounding the proscriptions were to have been effective, the 
proscriptions could have been a tool with a positive effect on the peace process. In 
chapter 3 I thoroughly present these five conditions and the way they relate to the case 
of the proscriptions of the LTTE. Then, in chapter 6, I analyze to what degree the 
threats and promises of proscription and de-proscription from the different actors 
towards the LTTE fulfilled these five conditions. The analysis through Haspeslagh‘s 
framework may show the proscriptions to have had a negative effect on the 
engagement of the LTTE; but were the proscriptions perhaps effective as threats and 
promises, or if they were not, then why? This combined analytical approach should 
give me a more complete and valid insight into the impact the proscriptions had on the 
process, and thus on whether or not the impact contributed to the failure of the process.   
  
 Methodology 1.3
My research design is that of a theory-guided single case, where I use an already 
developed analytical framework to examine the case of the 5
th
 Sri Lankan peace 
process. Theory-guided case studies ―aim to explain a single historical episode rather 
than to generalize beyond the data‖, and ―are explicitly structured by a well-developed 
conceptual framework that focuses attention on some theoretically speciﬁed aspects of 
reality and neglects others‖ (Levy, 2008, pp. 4). I argue that this type of design is the 
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most suitable for answering my research question. As peace processes are notoriously 
idiosyncratic, it is necessary to analyze a single case in-depth to gain crucial insight 
into it. The choice of this research design has several implications. Chapter 4 presents 
a more comprehensive discussion of my research design and its strengths and 
weaknesses in regards to reliability and validity. 
The two main methods I have chosen to gain data are literature studies and 
semi-structured interviews. Here I succinctly present the core characteristics of these 
two methods, simultaneously explaining why I have chosen them. Literature studies 
are important to gain important background information on all the topics that are 
included in my thesis, especially on terrorist proscriptions and the 5
th
 Sri Lankan peace 
process with all their actors and features. These topics involve a lot of information, so 
it is therefore necessary to gain a strong comprehension through reading a wide variety 
of academic writing, official government materials and newspaper articles. Some of 
the materials on these topics are of course classified but there exists a lot of open 
source information that provides the necessary background for my thesis.  
 Although quite a lot of information exists on the topics I am examining there is 
a limit to the amount of what I am specifically looking at, which is the effect of the 
proscriptions on the 5
th
 Sri Lankan peace process. The information concerning this 
often takes the shape of just a part of an analysis; it has never been the main focus of 
an analysis of the Sri Lankan case. Therefore I found it necessary to supplement the 
secondary sources with interviews of my own. I have interviewed all the arguably 
most important participants from the Norwegian side of the peace process, as well as 
sources with insight from academia, a former LTTE press liaison, and a former US 
ambassador to Sri Lanka. Together these interviews have given me much information 
from a broad set of respondents. I have been able to ask specific questions and thus 
gain much more specific and suitable information to answer my research question than 
I would have done without interviews. 
 The interview method I chose was semi-structured interviews, as this appeared 
the most suitable for what I wanted to achieve with the interviews. When conducting 
semi-structured interviews, the researcher typically has an interview guide, which 
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contains a list of questions or topics. The questions should be open-ended so the 
interviewee has a lot of freedom in how to reply, with the possibility of in-depth 
answers. The researcher can also be flexible in choosing the order of the questions, and 
ask follow-up questions if the interviewee raises an interesting point the researcher 
was not aware of. Thus, semi-structured interviews give both the researcher and the 
interviewee a lot of flexibility and freedom (Bryman, 2004, pp. 321). This freedom is 
also very appropriate for my respondents as they are all highly educated and hold 
powerful positions. According to Aberbach and Rockman, these types of elite 
respondents are more comfortable being able to answer with freedom, as opposed to 
close-ended questions (2002, pp. 674). As I am examining a single case in-depth, I 
argue that semi-structured interviews are more suitable than the large-n structured 
interview or the less focused unstructured interview method.   
 
 Disposition 1.4
The analysis is structured as follows: After I have finished the introductory chapter I 
proceed to chapter 2 which provides the necessary background for the analysis. There I 
give a descriptive background to the case of the 5
th
 Sri Lankan peace process, 
presenting a concise chronological overview of the process from its early beginnings 
to the destruction of the LTTE in 2009. Then I advance to my examination of the way 
in which the proscription mechanisms of the most important terrorist lists function. I 
look at the main features of the lists of the United States and the European Union as 
well as the increase in national lists. This is to give myself and the readers an 
understanding of what these proscriptions are and how they function. In chapter 3 I 
begin by categorizing the consequences of terrorist proscription into two broad types, 
consisting of ‗material‘ and ‗ideational‘ effects. Then I present my analytical approach 
in a more detailed fashion, in addition to a brief review of other relevant literature on 
the subject. Chapter 4 presents the methodological framework and research design of 
the study in more detail, with an emphasis on issues of reliability and validity.  
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Chapter 5 analyzes the case in-depth through the theoretical framework of 
Sophie Haspeslagh, and I then use chapter 6 to analyze the threats and promises 
surrounding the proscriptions of the LTTE according to the five conditions from the 
theoretical contribution of Jon Hovi. Together, these two chapters constitute my 
empirical analysis. In the last chapter, I summarize my findings from the analysis and 
discuss the extent to which the impact of terrorist proscriptions of the LTTE helps 
explain the failure of 5
th
 peace process in Sri Lanka. Finally, I draw some lessons from 
my analysis of the case for a more constructive use of terrorist proscriptions as a tool 
in the future.    
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2 Background 
This chapter provides the necessary background for my analysis. The first section 
presents the case of the 5
th
 peace process on Sri Lanka. The second section examines 
the main features of the terrorist proscription lists and how they are meant to operate.  
 Sri Lanka’s 5th Peace Process 2.1
The 5
th
 peace process on Sri Lanka took place between 1997 and 2009, if the time 
period where informal or formal talks were held is included. The formal talks took 
place in different cities around the world in 2002 and 2003 (Goodhand, Klem, & 
Sørbø, 2011, pp. 39-40). The two main parties in the conflict were the Government of 
Sri Lanka (GoSL) and the armed group the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), 
with Norway serving as the main facilitator of the peace process. In this chapter I give 
a concise overview of the process whilst referring to the events that have significant 
importance for answering my research question. I do this chronologically, starting with 
a more formal Norwegian contact in 1997, and ending with the death of the LTTE 
leadership in 2009.  
 
2.1.1 A New Attempt: 1997-2000 
To talk about the Sri Lankan peace process as a or the process is misleading, as there 
have been several peace processes that to some extent influence and flow into each 
other from 1983 to 2009 (Stokke, 2010, pp. 10). From 1983 until 2001 approximately 
65.000 people had died as a direct consequence of the conflict, averaging 285 deaths 
per month for a population of around 15 million, in addition to a large number of 
wounded and displaced people (Seneviratne & Endaragalle, 2006, pp. 118). Although 
formal talks did not take place before 2002, Norway offered their services as early as 
in 1991, after the previous peace attempt by India had halted (Goodhand et al., 2011, 
pp. 29). Throughout the 1990s it seemed to become clearer to both the government and 
the LTTE that they were in a no-win-no-lose deadlock situation in regards to the 
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conflict, and Norway was drawn closer to the situation when they facilitated a crucial 
kidney operation for Anton Balasingham, the LTTE‘s head negotiator, in 1998. After 
that Norway was given a formal mandate by the Kumaratunga government to begin 
talking with the LTTE, although the group were still formally banned under national 
terrorist legislation at this time (Goodhand et al., 2011, pp. 31).  
 Later it came as an unhappy surprise to the Norwegians when President 
Kumaratunga announced the mandate given to them on the BBC in 1999. It did not 
take long before anti-Norwegian statements and demonstrations arose from nationalist 
voices in the Sinhalese community (Goodhand et al., 2011, pp. 32). The conflict on Sri 
Lanka has a strong ethnic dimension where the government side is largely comprised 
of the Sinhalese majority, whilst the LTTE is comprised of the Tamil minority. This 
dimension was an important factor of the process, but as it is not relevant for 
answering my research question it will not be emphasized in my analysis.  
 After the informal talks began the LTTE insisted on being de-proscribed by the 
government, but President Kumaratunga refused. She argued that such a measure 
―must be conditional on actual progress during the peace talks‖ and claimed she had 
been made to ―look like a fool‖ the last time she indulged the LTTE in 1995 
(Goodhand et al., 2011, pp. 33). This shows how closely trust is associated with 
measures and counter-measures concerning proscription. Some progress was still made 
in 2000, when an ‗Agreement following an understanding on humanitarian measures‘ 
was jointly signed. On December 24
th
 2000 the LTTE leader Prabhakaran called for 
unconditional talks and declared a unilateral cease-fire for the LTTE, creating an 
important marker for future progress (Uyangoda, 2006, pp. 247).   
 
2.1.2 A New Hope: 2001-2003 
This period of the peace process included formal talks between the two combatant 
parties, and a real hope of peace began to emerge. When Kristine Höglund and Isak 
Svensson analyzed the process in 2002, they evaluated the prospects of a negotiated 
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solution as ―promising‖ (2002, pp.103). In this period Norway tried to engage other 
stakeholders such as India and the United States in the process, which would probably 
be helpful due to their power and thus enabling a ―stick‖ to complement Norway‘s 
―carrots‖. But even though the US was interested and the personal interest of then-
Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage was strong, the US‘s role was ―limited‖ 
due to their proscription of the LTTE since 1997, with the LTTE also proscribed by 
India (Goodhand et al., 2011, pp. 33; Lundstead, 2007, pp. 13). This limitation would 
not seem too crucial at the time but would later place both direct obstacles to the 
process whilst also in general removing the possibility of supplying more forceful 
negotiating tactics from a superpower.  
 Nevertheless, at this time things seemed quite positive. After the LTTE declared 
a unilateral cease-fire in December 2000 government forces attacked them, 
interpreting the move as a sign of weakness. When the LTTE defeated them 
comprehensively, in addition to a successful attack on the international airport in 
Colombo in June 2001, it became clear that the LTTE‘s cease-fire measure did not 
indicate a waning of their ability or willingness to use violent means. At this point it 
seemed that both parties were beginning to let it sink in that negotiations were a viable 
and attractive option. This was indicated by the government‘s lack of success in 
defeating the LTTE by military means. Meanwhile, for the LTTE an event halfway 
round the world was about to change the environment in which they existed. 
 The attacks on the United States on September 11
th
 2001 ushered in a new era 
of international politics. After the attacks ―‘non-governmental actors‘ use of violence 
… lost most of its legitimacy‖ (Höglund & Svensson, 2002, pp. 106). This were to 
have no immediate effect, but it were to have ―a major impact on [the LTTE‘s] room 
for maneuver in the years to come‖ (Goodhand et al., 2011, pp. 35). This also 
increased the US interest in the process, with their new determination to confront 
terrorism globally (Lunstead, 2007, pp. 13). This is a fact the LTTE and their leader 
Prabhakaran was aware of, which is evident in a proclamation in his annual Heroes‘ 
Day speech: ―We can‘t ignore the realities of today‘s world. We have to realize this 
and adjust our path to freedom‖ (in Höglund & Svensson, 2002, pp. 107). 
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Furthermore, as the LTTE was heavily dependent on economic influx from the Tamil 
diaspora (estimated at 60 % of their total income), the prospect of increased difficulty 
in obtaining this funding due to proscription measures must have been daunting 
(Gunaratna, 1999). All of this pointed both parties in the direction of a negotiated 
solution, which seemed to crawl closer to something of a ripe moment for peace. 
 This potential progress became evident in the formal talks and documents that 
ensued in the following months. Another seemingly positive event that happened 
simultaneously was the electoral success of the more pragmatic United National Front 
party in the elections in December 2001, although a debilitating political cohabitation 
between a Prime Minister and President from two different parties ensued from this 
(Goodhand et al., 2011, pp. 34-35). Still, within a month of the election there were 
unilateral cease-fires in place from both sides. And then on February 22
nd
 2002 a 
historic breakthrough was reached with a joint Cease-Fire Agreement (CFA). This 
agreement stipulated three main points: 
1. An end to offensive military operations. 
2. Measures to restore normalcy, such as respect for international law and 
norms (no torture, etc.). 
3. The creation of the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM), an on-site 
mission monitoring the CFA conducted by the five Nordic countries 
(Goodhand et al., 2011, pp.36). 
From April 2002 until March 2003 there were six rounds of formal talks between the 
government and LTTE in various locations, and there was much attention and interest 
attached to these talks both domestically in Sri Lanka and internationally (Gooneratne, 
2007, pp. 22-33). This period can be described as the apex of the peace process, where 
the government even decided to de-proscribe the LTTE on September 6
th
 2002. The 
de-proscription created more of a sense of equality and legitimization for the 
negotiations, as the LTTE now felt they could properly ―represent the Tamil nation as 
legal representatives on a status of parity‖ (Balasingham, 2004, pp. 373). This decision 
seems to have been crucial in propelling the formal talks, as the proscription has been 
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described as the ―most serious among the obstacles to early direct talks‖ and the 
decision to de-proscribe as ―[the only] way in which one could begin to engage the 
LTTE in serious discussion‖ (Uyangoda, 2003, pp. 3; Weerakoon, 2006, pp. 11). The 
de-proscription from the national government showed willingness and a seriousness 
about the peace process that was very promising, and could perhaps have been a 
decisive moment in turning the LTTE from a violent group into a peaceful political 
party. Alas it was not to be so. 
 
2.1.3 A New Disappointment: 2003-2005 
The optimism that seemed to instill itself into the process did not last very long, as a 
controversy arose when an international donor meeting was scheduled to take place in 
Washington DC in April 2003. With the LTTE being proscribed in the United States it 
was therefore not possible for them to be represented at the meeting, although US 
officials tried unsuccessfully to get the State Department to make an exception. This 
exclusion was described by the Tigers as a ―humiliation‖, ―totally unacceptable‖, and 
―against the spirit of the peace process‖, and led to the LTTE suspending participation 
in the formal talks (Balasingham, 2004, pp. 430-431). Afterwards there has been a lot 
of discussion and different opinions on whether this reaction from the LTTE was 
truthful, or if their exclusion was used as a pretext for extracting themselves from the 
process (Kristian Stokke, Interview
1
). This is hard to decipher correctly, and as the 
main players in the decision are now dead we will never know for sure. However, this 
analysis from Sumanasiri Liyanage seems to me to be quite insightful and is consistent 
with my impression of the event and the process: 
It was not the participation of the talks per se that seemed important to the LTTE. 
Rather it was the diplomatic value of the talks. The LTTE may not have been greatly 
concerned about the outcome of the meeting; but its presence at the meeting would 
have been a sign of international recognition, especially by the West. The LTTE 
                                                 
1
 All interviews were conducted in 2014, so this information is not added in every reference. 
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always emphasized the continuance of ―strategic parity or rather balance of power‖ 
between two adversarial parties as a pre-requisite of the process oriented towards a 
negotiated settlement. The exclusion from the Washington donor meeting was 
interpreted not as an isolated event but as a moment in a continuous process of 
weakening the LTTE‘ position vis-à-vis the Government of Sri Lanka (Liyanage, 
2008, pp. 117-118). 
The LTTE seemed to take their exclusion (and the government‘s inclusion) as a sign of 
the international community favoring the government and thus upending the precious 
and fragile parity that had seemed to exist between the two parties for a while. Making 
matters worse, the LTTE suspected that this was a deliberate strategy from the 
government to create an international safety-net of economic and military support so 
they could dominate the LTTE (Balasingham, 2004, pp. 435).   
 During the peace process there were several dynamic changes on the 
international arena that conspired to create the international safety-net for the 
government, which understandably worried the LTTE. The first change was the 
aforementioned attacks on September 11
th
 2001 and the ensuing ‗War on Terror‘, and 
the second was the ―changing international relations towards a multipolar world order 
and the emergence of ‗new‘ Asian powers (especially China and India) with economic 
and geopolitical interests in the Indian Ocean and an emphasis on state sovereignty 
and security‖ which ―created new opportunities for the GoSL to develop their military 
capability and successfully pursue a war against the LTTE‖ (Stokke, 2010, pp. 20). 
These dynamic changes on the international stage created a situation where the 
erstwhile parity between the two parties began to erode in favor of the government.  
 Simultaneously there were changes on the domestic scene that would accelerate 
the altering of the balance of power between the two parties. The first of three such 
important domestic events was the one which has been dubbed ‗the Karuna split‘. This 
occurred when the LTTE‘s eastern commander ‗Colonel‘ Karuna Amman broke away 
from the LTTE in March 2004, later seeking refuge in Colombo after military clashes 
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with a vengeful LTTE. This altered the military balance in a ―fundamental way‖, due 
to the loss of an experienced military leader, several thousands of cadres, and the 
―biggest intelligence leak in its [the LTTE‘s] history‖ (Goodhand et al., 2011, pp. 49-
50).  
 The second event was the devastating tsunami that hit South Asia December 
26
th
 2004. Over 35.000 Sri Lankans died that day, at least 21.000 were injured and 
more than 550.000 displaced from their homes (―Preliminary Damage and Needs 
Assessment,‖ 2005). This event, aside from being a terrible disaster, was neither 
wholly positive nor negative for the peace process, but somewhere in between. The 
LTTE was annoyed that the government refused international players such as Kofi 
Annan and Bill Clinton access to LTTE areas. But at the same time a crisis can often 
create an interruption from everyday politics. And when the everyday politics are in a 
lull as the peace process was at the time, a crisis can be helpful in setting a new stage 
on which to play. This seemed to happen when both parties showed willingness to 
develop a Post-Tsunami Operational Management Structure (P-TOMS) together for 
the arrangement of the tsunami aid. The agreement was eventually signed, and 
represented for a while a small ray of hope for the resurrection of the peace process. 
But a court case filed in the Supreme Court by a party of Buddhist Sinhala monks 
ruled the agreement unconstitutional (Goodhand et al., 2011, pp. 54).  
 The third domestic event was the election of Mahinda Rajapakse in November 
2005, who became a ―‘repository‘ for public dissent and frustration‖ about the peace 
process (Goodhand et al., 2011, pp. 55). Rajapakse used Norway, the SLMM and Erik 
Solheim as targets during his campaign, and thus gained votes by stirring up public 
resentment against the process, something which made the Norwegian peace efforts 
even tougher. The international developments and domestic events illuminated in this 
part of the chapter does not show everything, but guides our understanding of how the 
peace process went from hopeful and positive, to looking more and more hopeless 
during just a short time period. And it was about to get worse. 
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2.1.4 The First Destruction: 2006-2009 
Although there had been several collapses of Sri Lankan peace processes, what ensued 
in this time period was the first ever destruction of a party in the conflict. In this final 
part of the chapter I describe the last stretch of the path that led to the death of the 
LTTE in May 2009. 
 The step (or trigger-finger, more precisely) that instigated this last stretch of the 
path occurred on August 12
th
 2005, when a suspected LTTE sniper killed the Sri 
Lankan foreign minister Lakshman Kadiragamar. This led to strong condemnation of 
the LTTE both nationally and internationally, and furthermore it made the EU ban 
LTTE movements in the EU. In addition they said in a statement that they considered 
formal proscription of the LTTE as a terrorist organization, and added that member 
states could take ―additional measures‖ against the LTTE (Noyahr, 2006, pp. 391). 
Canada would later proscribe the LTTE in April 2006 and the EU followed formally 
the next month, which meant that Norway and Switzerland were then the only Western 
nations (and they are hardly superpowers) willing to meet with the LTTE.  
 The EU proscription was of direct consequence for the peace process, as three 
out of five of the nations that were partaking in the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission 
(SLMM) were EU members. As a result of the ban, the LTTE refused to accept their 
presence in the SLMM, which meant that 39 out of 57 monitors left the country in 
August 2006 (Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission, 2006). Although the SLMM leader 
issued a memo arguing against the ban, the EU did not budge
2
. Irrespective of the EU 
proscription‘s strategic value or wisdom, it was now a fact on the ground. 
Communication with the LTTE became more and more difficult, especially after the 
death of their head negotiator Anton Balasingham in December 2006. 
 The spark that ignited the flame was when the LTTE closed an irrigation sluice 
gate in July 2006, which the government interpreted as a strong provocation, and 
                                                 
2
 Around this time the Norwegian government decided to change their terrorist list from the EU list to the UN 
list. Their reasoning is strongly linked to the situation in Sri Lanka: ―Continued alignment with the EU list could 
cause difficulties for Norway in its role as neutral facilitator in certain peace processes. Norway‘s role could 
become difficult if one of the parties involved was included on the EU list, and the opportunities for contact were 
thus restricted‖ (―Norway‘s cooperation with the EU on the fight against terrorism,‖ 2006).  
15 
 
launched a ground offensive (Goodhand et al., 2011, pp. 61). This was to be the end of 
the promise that the Cease-Fire Agreement had held. The return to violence was met 
with criticism from the international community, but the Sri Lankan government 
countered and diluted the Western pressure. They did this in ways that showed that the 
process had taught them to be adept students of the international arena, unlike their 
―somewhat amateurish‖ statesmanship in the beginning (Stokke, Interview).  
 Previously it had been almost unthinkable that a military victory could be 
reached by either party, but now the tide was beginning to turn in favor of the 
government. They achieved this in part by purchasing military equipment from 
countries such as China and Pakistan, and with support from Indian and US 
intelligence (Erik Solheim, Interview). At this point the erstwhile relative parity 
between the two parties in the peace process was altered. In part due to the 
―asymmetry in the international actor‘s dealing with the state and non-state actors‖ as 
there was a ―pattern of international support and legitimacy for the war against LTTE‖ 
(Stokke, 2010, pp. 20). Thus the conflict was ―discursively reframed from being a 
conflict over minority rights and self-determination that should be resolved through 
politically negotiated liberal peace, to become a war against terrorism where defeating 
LTTE became a prerequisite for state security, rule of law and peace‖ (Stokke, 2010, 
pp. 20).  
By July 2007 the eastern region of Sri Lanka was under government control, 
which left only the LTTE‘s main stronghold in the north. Norway continued its efforts 
to maintain focus on human rights and dialogue, but a peaceful solution seemed 
increasingly unlikely at this point. According to a Sri Lankan diplomat, non-Western 
countries told the Sri Lankan government to ignore Western pressure and ―get it over 
with‖ (Goodhand et al., 2011, pp. 67). And soon they did; in the middle of May 2009 
the remaining LTTE leaders were killed in a final attack, with a civilian death toll 
plausibly exceeding 30.000 over the last few months of the conflict (International 
Crisis Group, 2010). Thus the Sri Lankan 5
th
 peace process ended with a complete 
military victory for the government, and the destruction of the Liberation Tigers of 
Tamil Eelam. 
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This description of the Sri Lankan 5
th
 peace process has been far from 
exhaustive, and has possibly over-accentuated the international and proscription 
dimensions as that is my main focus. But it has hopefully provided a succinct and 
neutral description of the main events and atmosphere of the dawn, zenith and nadir of 
the peace process.  
Figure 1: Timeline of terrorist proscriptions of the LTTE 
 
This figure shows a timeline of when the most important actors proscribed or de-
proscribed the LTTE. The large circles signify proscriptions, and the small circle 
signifies de-proscription of the LTTE. In the next section of the chapter I examine how 
the terrorist list proscriptions function. 
 
 Terrorist List Proscription   2.2
Different countries around the world have a long history of proscribing groups as 
terrorist entities. The UK for example used it in Northern Ireland as early as the 1920s, 
but after the attacks on the United States in 2001 there has been a marked increase in 
the number and intensity of these lists. In this brief section I give a concise and clear 
overview of arguably the most important terrorist lists, those of the United States and 
the European Union. I present the two in order, before taking a brief look at the way 
national terrorist lists have increased both in number and scope over the last decade. 
Because of this increase there might soon be very few countries left that can take a 
neutral third-party position in peace negotiations including a proscribed group. The 
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United Nations is of course a major international actor, but their terrorist list contains 
mainly Al-Qaeda and the Taliban, so I will not discuss it in my thesis. This section I 
feel is necessary in order to understand the main features of these lists and how they 
are meant to operate, as this is far from common knowledge. 
 
2.2.1 The Terror Lists of the United States 
The most important actor involved with anti-terror activities over the last decade is 
undoubtedly the United States. The US carries several lists that can be described as 
terrorist proscription lists, but here I focus on the most important one, the Foreign 
Terrorist Organizations list (FTO) (Giorgetti, 2006, pp. 3). This list deals specifically 
with groups and invokes some of the strongest sanctions of all the US lists. This is 
how the list and its purpose are described by the US Bureau of Counterterrorism:  
Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs) are foreign organizations that are designated 
by the Secretary of State. FTO designations play a critical role in our fight against 
terrorism and are an effective means of curtailing support for terrorist activities and 
pressuring groups to get out of the terrorism business (―Foreign Terrorist 
Organizations,‖ 2012).  
To understand the relevant features of this list better I ask three questions of it. The 
first question is: Who decides who is proscribed? For the FTO list the deciding 
authority is better described as a process than the decision of a single actor or agency. 
It begins with the office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism in the State 
Department identifying the potentially proscribed group. Then a report is sent to the 
Secretary of State. If the Secretary agrees to the charge, then she will designate the 
group in consultation with the Attorney General and the Secretary of the Treasury. 
Lastly, Congress has seven days to block the proscription; if this does not happen then 
the proscription takes effect (―Foreign Terrorist Organizations,‖ 2012; Giorgetti, 2006, 
pp. 17-18). As there are several actors and offices involved in the process it should be, 
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at least on paper, a thorough procedure. As of May 2
nd
 2014, there are 58 groups on 
the FTO list (―Foreign Terrorist Organizations,‖ 2012).  
 The second question thus becomes: What happens, or more precisely what is 
supposed to happen, to the 58 groups on this list after being proscribed? The US State 
Department names three specific sanctions placed upon proscribed groups and, 
interestingly, five explicit reasons why the proscription is performed. The three 
sanctions are: 
 It is unlawful for a person in the United States or subject to the jurisdiction of 
the United States to knowingly provide ‗material support or resources‘ to a 
designated FTO. 
 Representatives and members of a designated FTO, if they are aliens, are 
inadmissible to and, in certain circumstances, removable from the United 
States. 
 Any U.S. financial institution that becomes aware that it has possession of or 
control over funds in which a designated FTO or its agent has an interest must 
retain possession of or control over the funds and report the funds (―Foreign 
Terrorist Organizations,‖ 2012). 
These sanctions are quite tough and far-reaching, but what perhaps is more interesting 
than the specific sanctions are why these sanctions are placed upon the proscribed 
groups. The US State Department lists these five intended effects as the reasoning 
behind the sanctions:  
1. Supports our efforts to curb terrorism financing and to encourage other nations 
to do the same. 
2. Stigmatizes and isolates designated terrorist organizations internationally. 
3. Deters donations or contributions to and economic transactions with named 
organizations. 
4. Heightens public awareness and knowledge of terrorist organizations. 
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5. Signals to other governments our concern about named organizations (―Foreign 
Terrorist Organizations,‖ 2012). 
An interesting aspect here is that two of the effects are concerned with material effects 
and three of them are ideational. This aspect highlights the strong focus and effects 
that terrorist proscription has on symbol politics, and not just on more material effects 
such as the right to deny funding and admission to territory. Further attention to this 
dichotomy is given in chapter 3. 
 The third and last question of the FTO list is: How does a group get off the list? 
This is potentially a very important question for proscribed groups involved in peace 
processes, but is the question that is perhaps most likely to be overlooked. There are 
five ways in which a group may be taken off the FTO list: 
 The Secretary of State must revoke a designation if the Secretary finds that 
the circumstances that were the basis of the designation have changed in such 
a manner as to warrant a revocation. 
 The Secretary of State must revoke a designation if the Secretary finds that 
the national security of the United States warrants a revocation. 
 The Secretary of State may revoke a designation at any time. 
 An Act of Congress. 
 A Court order in federal court after a challenge in court to a group‘s 
proscription (―Foreign Terrorist Organizations,‖ 2012; Giorgetti, 2006, pp. 
19-20). 
No challenges in court have yet to be successful, and there has been no Act of 
Congress, but nine groups have been voluntarily de-proscribed by the Secretary of 
State (―Foreign Terrorist Organizations,‖ 2012). Interestingly none of these nine were 
de-proscribed between 2001 and 2009, with five from 1999 to 2001 and four since 
2009. This might indicate that the aftermath of the September 11
th
 attacks created an 
environment where it was very difficult to take a group off the list for many years. 
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2.2.2 The Terror List of the European Union 
The EU actually has two lists, but one of them is the list created to implement the UN 
Security Council Resolution 1267 against the Taliban and Al-Qaeda. Therefore I focus 
on the autonomous list created by the EU as this is a more relevant approach. I will ask 
the same questions of this list as I did of the US FTO list. 
The first question then becomes: Who decides who is proscribed? The decision 
to proscribe a group ultimately lies with a unanimous decision by the Council, after an 
earlier process of proposal. The process begins by a proposal submitted by a Member 
State or a third state, then the proposal is evaluated by the Common Position 931 
Working Party before it is either recommended or discarded to the Council. The 
evaluation process in the Working Party is confidential (―The EU list of persons, 
groups and entities subject to specific measures to combat terrorism,‖ 2009; Thorne, 
2006b). 
The second question is: What happens to the groups on the list? The most 
relevant of the sanctions that the EU shall implement are: 
 Trade sanctions (general or specific trade sanctions, arms embargoes). 
 Financial sanctions (freezing of funds or economic resources, prohibition on 
financial transactions, restrictions on export credits or investment). 
 Flight bans and restrictions on admission (―Sanctions or restrictive measures,‖ 
2008). 
These sanctions are to be implemented under dual responsibility for the Member States 
and the Commission (―Sanctions or restrictive measures,‖ 2008).   
 The thirds question is: How does one get off the list? Persons, groups and 
entities included in the list can:  
• Request the Council to reconsider their case, on the basis of supporting 
documentation.  
• Challenge the decision of the national competent authority according to 
national procedures.  
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• If subject to restrictive measures, challenge the Council's decision before the 
General Court. 
• If subject to restrictive measures, request humanitarian exemptions to cover 
basic needs (―The EU list of persons, groups and entities subject  to specific 
measures to combat terrorism,‖ 2009).  
The Council can also voluntarily decide to de-proscribe an entity after a process that 
mirrors the one which creates the proscription. A unanimous decision by the Council 
will also be necessary on this occasion. This has occurred at least once, but the reasons 
for the de-proscription have not been made public, so the necessary conditions for this 
to occur are somewhat unclear (Thorne, 2006b, pp. 9). There are no provisions for 
exempting proscribed groups taking part in ongoing peace processes in the EU list 
(Thorne 2006b, pp. 7).  
 
2.2.3 National Terrorist Lists 
Since 2001 the number and scope of national terrorist lists have increased (Rix, 2007; 
Smith, 2003). This has occurred in two ways: one, nations have implemented measures 
from multilateral organizations such as the UN and the EU, and two: through unilateral 
national lists (most notably in the UK and other Commonwealth nations such as 
Australia and Canada)(―Listed Terrorist Entities,‖ 2013; Rix, 2007; Thorne, 2006a). 
The third option of not keeping a terrorist list seems increasingly farfetched for 
countries around the world, and the discussion seems to be more about which list to 
use (Tallaksen, 2013). This issue is not delineated to the western world as the lists 
follow the global reach of terrorism (Adebajo, 2003). 
Seemingly, these lists have grown during the last decade or so, and it is difficult 
to imagine a world without them. Norway and Switzerland have flourished with 
peacemaking initiatives in this period. This comes as no surprise as these two countries 
are two of the few not constrained by large terrorist lists, as they stand outside the EU 
(―Managing Peace  Processes Volume 3,‖ 2013, pp. 23). As Norwegian politicians 
have considered implementing the EU list nationally, there might soon be very few or 
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no countries left that might take a neutral third-party position in potential peace 
negotiations including a proscribed group (Tallaksen, 2013). Therefore, studying the 
effects of these lists is becoming increasingly important. 
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3 Analytical Approach 
In this chapter I present the analytical approach that will be used through the rest of 
my thesis. I begin the section by categorizing the consequences of proscription into 
two broad types. Then I present my analytical approach which consists of two theories 
by Sophie Haspeslagh and Jon Hovi. My aim is to combine these two theories in an 
analytical approach that captures the essential features of the case. Lastly I create a 
brief review of some of the other relevant literature that exists on the consequences for 
peace processes by terrorist proscription.  
 
 The Two Types of Consequences of Terrorist 3.1
Proscriptions 
Based on what I have learned in the previous chapter, the types of consequences from 
terrorist proscription can be sorted into two categories. These are ‗material‘ and 
‗ideational‘ effects. I believe this categorization is helpful for making the effects of the 
proscriptions more clear, and they are central to my analysis of the severity condition 
in section 6.2. The classification of the consequences of terrorist proscription into 
these two categories is supported by the reasoning behind the FTO list as shown in 
section 2.2.1. I will now elaborate on these two types of effects. 
Material effects are for instance the prohibition on proscribed groups of 
financing, travelling, or arms sale. Some of this is fairly straight-forward: few will 
argue that weapons procurement or direct financing to proscribed groups is anything 
close to a constructive path to peace. These are viable, easily legitimized and relatively 
effective ways of hindering terrorist violence. But bans on travelling and the umbrella 
definition of material support might have consequences that are intended (such as 
stopping terrorists in hi-jacking planes or travelling to foreign targets). But they could 
also have some that are unintended such as when the LTTE was barred from attending 
a donor conference in Washington DC in 2003 due to their proscription and then 
subsequently suspended the peace talks (Balasingham, 2004, pp. 439). This shows a 
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way in which the proscription of a group might have valid counter-terrorism functions, 
as well as adverse consequences for reaching a peaceful solution to a conflict. 
 Now I turn to look more closely at the ideational effects of proscription. One of 
the most interesting points of the reasoning behind the FTO list is the second point 
concerning the objective of stigmatizing and isolating the proscribed group. In addition 
to this, several others of the intended effects of the list are concerned with what can be 
described as ideational effects. The issue of proscription is highly salient for the armed 
groups, as the matter of ―successfully ascribing or resisting the label of terrorism 
emerges as the most important ideational objective in the international arena‖ 
(Nadarajah & Sriskandarajah, 2005, pp. 94). The terror lists include both material and 
ideational effects as: 
These lists are not just designed to combat criminality. They are designed to de-
legitimize certain organizations and their attendant struggles. Proscription regimes are 
not simply legal tools against terror but ideological and political ones as well. They 
communicate societies‘ disfavor on the most profound scale (Muller, 2008, pp. 129). 
 Theory on the Consequences of Proscriptions               3.2
The theoretical field on this issue is still in its infancy. The world that the literature 
tries to understand has primarily existed after the terrorist attacks in 2001, and most 
contributions are written in the last five years
3
. Here I present one of the theoretical 
contributions that I have chosen to be included in my analytical approach.  
 The theory is a product of the work done by Sophie Haspeslagh on 
understanding the connection between the proscription regimes and their impact on 
third-party efforts in peace processes (2013). Haspeslagh‘s contribution is very 
important as it is one of the first to delve into this specific issue, and it is based on both 
                                                 
3
 Terrorism did exist, of course before 9/11, for instance with the IRA. Margaret Thatcher refused to talk to the 
IRA at the height of their violence, but it was not until the political engagement with the IRA in the 90s that they 
moved away from terrorist means and transformed into an exclusively political party. This transformation 
appears to have gained increased scholarly attention after the renewed relevance of the topic post-9/11 (Toros, 
2008).    
25 
 
theoretical work and the experiences of peace practitioners. This type of duality is a 
necessary part of all work on this subject, as each different case dictates both a general 
theoretical understanding but also strong flexibility in analysts due to the empirical 
complexities that the cases bring with them.  
 Haspeslagh‘s theory is based around ―two preconditions that are necessary for 
third-parties to engage with and influence armed groups‖ (2013, pp. 195). These are 
access and trust. Here, access is the equivalent of material effects and trust is the 
equivalent of ideational effects. Access is important because ―if a third-party actor is 
not able to contact and meet armed groups, it will severely impede them in talking, 
organizing workshops and so on‖ (ibid). This is simple enough; if you cannot meet or 
talk to someone it is very difficult to constructively engage them. 
How can the proscription regimes affect third-party access to listed armed 
groups? First of all it can lead to representatives of governments that have proscribed a 
group being barred from contact with them (although some level of secret back-
channel contact will likely be possible). This means that a group like the Liberation 
Tigers of Tamil Eelam would (in 2006 and later) be out of bounds for the government 
personnel of all the EU countries, the United States, Canada and several others. Often 
practitioners will be confused as to whether their actions are legal or not due to the 
somewhat unclear nature of proscription and the general lack of information for how it 
shall affect work in practice (Haspeslagh, 2013, pp. 196). This in turn might lead to 
what some have dubbed the ―chilling effect‖ that proscriptions can have, as third-party 
actors would rather avoid situations of unclear legality than potentially be exposed 
(Dudouet, 2011). This is the unclear present situation many government 
representatives and NGO workers find themselves in. 
 The second precondition is trust. Trust is highly salient, because ―without a 
level of trust between third-party actors and an armed group, it will not be possible for 
third-party actors to effectively engage with a group‖ (Haspeslagh, 2013, pp. 195). If 
an actor attempting engagement does not acquire the trust of the proscribed group (and 
the other relevant parties to a conflict), it would be exceedingly difficult to achieve 
results of any worth. The opportunity for acquiring trust is of course dependent on the 
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other precondition of access being present, as well as continued access is dependent on 
the building of trust. The relationship between the two preconditions is thus clearly 
symbiotic. According to Haspeslagh, trust can only be achieved if the third-party actor 
is perceived to be impartial in respect to the parties to the conflict. And ―in terms of a 
third-party‘s perceived impartiality, which is an essential component of trust-building 
between third-parties and armed groups, proscription regimes are of increased 
significance‖ (Haspeslagh, 2013, pp. 198). Proscriptions can seemingly affect these 
two preconditions, but why are these preconditions necessary? 
 Sophie Haspeslagh argues that the two preconditions are required in order to 
fulfill four roles that third-parties can constructively play in peace processes. These 
four are: 
1. Understanding armed groups 
2. Influencing armed groups (the way it sees itself and its environment) 
3. Affecting strategic calculations 
4. Training in conflict resolution (Haspeslagh, 2013). 
  
The first role for third-parties is to understand armed groups: these are groups that will 
often be proscribed on a terrorist list. Without knowledge and insight into these 
groups, any type of engagement would likely yield poor results. As a UN staff member 
put it, ―understanding armed group‘s objectives, perspectives and realities is 
crucial…‖ (in Haspeslagh, 2013, pp. 199). This type of insight into the inner ‗mind‘ of 
an organization is very important, perhaps even more so for an armed group. As 
Haspeslagh describes it: 
Particularly with armed groups, behavior and actions cannot always be interpreted at 
face value. Accurate information about armed groups, their realities and their 
aspirations are required to be able to interpret their behavior. Armed groups‘ actual 
perceptions are often hidden from the public because groups want to avoid showing 
weakness. Understanding how an armed group views violence requires direct 
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engagement with that group; it is not something that can be inferred through news 
reports or secondary sources (2013, pp. 199).    
This role can be played by actors such as government representatives, IGO or NGO 
workers, and academics. Haspeslagh argues that we know too little about the effect of 
proscriptions on this role at the present time, but that it is possible that ―challenges 
around access to groups have led to problems for third-party actors to gather enough 
information to help them understand groups‘ perspectives, motivations and dynamics‖ 
(2013, pp. 199). If proscriptions create difficulties concerning this role it could 
negatively affect the possibilities of reaching viable peace agreements. 
 The second role for third-parties is to influence armed groups in the way it sees 
itself and its environment. ―Some groups are far removed from global political 
discussions and not fully informed about the wider political dynamics. Third-parties 
have helped groups develop a more nuanced understanding by sharing other 
perspectives with them‖ (Haspeslagh, 2013, pp. 201). In this way third-parties can help 
groups reflect about their own agenda and the instruments they use for reaching their 
goals. In times of conflict communication will often be reduced to violence and 
propaganda, and armed groups (and governments) might need some help in 
articulating their messages to each other and delivering them without leaks to other 
audiences. One peace practitioner recounts to Haspeslagh how he was surprised how 
little certain groups reflected on their own agenda, and that this reflection often truly 
began for the first time when engaged by third-parties (in Haspeslagh, 2013, pp. 201).  
 The third role third-parties might play is by affecting strategic calculations. In 
this way ―third-parties can also influence how a group relates to a conflict. In certain 
cases they can contribute to a shift in a group‘s strategic calculations on whether to 
pursue violent or other means‖ (Haspeslagh, 2013, pp. 202). If third-party actors do 
not have sufficient access to proscribed groups or cannot win their trust, then very 
little can be achieved in way of affecting the groups‘ strategic calculations. I believe 
this third role is quite similar to the previous one, but I am aware of this in my analysis 
and highlight the way in which they differ.  
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 One of the reasons why it may be difficult to influence the strategic calculations 
of these groups is the blanket nature of the proscription regimes. ―There is no 
discrimination possible between armed groups that have said they seek engagement 
and those that will never seek engagement‖ (Haspeslagh, 2013, pp. 2002). Peace 
practitioners have said that they feel this has led to ‗pro-engagement camps‘ being 
undermined within the groups, and that the generalized banning ―does not encourage 
dialogue or the resolution of conflict‖ (in Haspeslagh, 2013, pp. 2002). As I 
discovered earlier in my research, in most of the proscription regimes there is little 
opportunity or precedence for de-listing. This might affect the way the decision 
makers in the groups view the different courses of action, and then one might see:  
a case of individuals within armed groups making a calculation about the external 
environment and the strategies that would be most effective to advance their cause. In 
cases when groups are listed, political negotiations or changes in human rights 
practices are less appealing if the groups cannot be rewarded by changes in [the] 
proscription regime (Haspeslagh, 2013, pp. 203).  
If the groups do not see a way out of their proscription by changing their behavior, 
then a change is probably unlikely. This only illuminates the need for more research 
and knowledge on this subject. If proscription might induce this type of change, under 
which circumstances is this most likely to occur? I use a second theory by Jon Hovi in 
my analytical approach, which will expand on this question of under which conditions 
proscription might be an effective mechanism for inducing strategic change in armed 
groups.  
 The fourth role third-parties can play is by training groups in conflict resolution. 
Armed groups are likely to have less expertise than governments in negotiations and 
diplomatic affairs. Therefore, efforts to train armed groups in negotiation processes 
can play an important part in how constructively the group might engage in a 
negotiated peace process (Haspeslagh, 2013, pp. 203). As put by Fink Haysom, 
―adversaries who are poor negotiators make for [a] poor negotiation process‖ (2005, 
pp. 85). It is thus very important for the members of an armed group involved in a 
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potential peace process to receive the necessary training so a constructive process 
becomes more likely. 
How might the proscription of a group impair this training? Funds received 
from governments that have proscription regimes cannot be legally made available to 
listed groups in any way. Therefore it seems likely ―that some important opportunities 
to train armed groups and support them in their transformation process away from 
violence are being affected by proscription regimes‖ (Haspeslagh, 2013, pp. 204). 
I have now presented the theory of the impact of proscription by Sophie 
Haspeslagh. It is based on the two preconditions of access and trust, which is 
necessary for third-parties to play four important roles in peace processes. Figure 2 
illustrates the theoretical assumed causal chain beginning with the proscription as an 
independent variable. The proscription then impacts the intermediary variables of the 
level of access and trust between the actors in a peace process, and the decrease in 
these pre-conditions affects the ability for third-parties to play the four roles outlined 
by Haspeslagh. The negative impact on the third-parties ability to play these roles in a 
constructive manner then diminishes the chances of concluding the peace process with 
a peace agreement, which is the dependent variable.  
Figure 2: Model of Haspeslagh‘s theoretical framework      
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 Theory on Terrorist Proscription as a Threat 3.3
I now present another theory, one that is not specifically created for analyzing the 
effect of terrorist proscription but is a more general theory on the effectiveness of 
threats. I argue that proscriptions are made to influence behavior in others and are thus 
in effect a threat. The threat of proscription can be made before a proscription is 
implemented, so as to change the policies of the target according to the threathener‘s 
desires. Reversely, after a proscription is in place, the promise of de-proscription can 
be made with the same intention of altering the targets incentive-structure in a way that 
makes it change its policies. Therefore, looking at theory on threats could give some 
analytically interesting insights into terrorist proscriptions, specifically their purpose 
and effectiveness as a mechanism for changing the behavior of the armed groups by 
altering their incentive-structure. When using proscription as threats and promises one 
attempts to achieve the same as third-parties do with the third role of ‗affecting 
strategic calculations‘ in Haspeslagh‘s theory, but through a different mechanism.  
While the first theory by Sophie Haspeslagh examines the negative consequences 
that stem from proscription, this theory by Hovi may help us understand how 
proscription can be an effective tool for changing the behavior of armed groups 
towards peaceful means. My analytical approach combines the two theoretical 
approaches, and thus allows for an analysis that could potentially uncover both 
negative and positive effects of proscription in the pursuit of peace. Jon Hovi‘s 
analytical framework consists of five theoretical conditions for a threat to be effective. 
According to Hovi, the threat is effective if it is:  
1. Relevant 
2. Severe 
3. Credible 
4. Complete 
5. Clear (1998, pp. 13-16) 
I will now briefly describe these conditions in order. The first is that the threat has to 
be relevant. This requires that the target has the freedom of action to make it possible 
31 
 
for it to adjust its policy in the in desired direction. Additionally the target must also 
have an incentive to act ―contrary to the threatener‘s desires in the first place‖, or else 
there is no need to threaten, and the actions of the target is not caused by the threat 
(Hovi, 1998, pp. 13-14). If these two dimensions are met, then the threat can be said to 
be relevant. In my case this means that the LTTE must have a possible choice in 
changing its policy away from violent action and that they would prefer to continue 
with violence if they were not threatened with proscription.  
 Secondly, the threat has to be sufficiently severe. This means that ―the target 
must prefer to comply with the threatener‘s demands, rather than to defy these 
demands and have the threat effectuated‖ (Hovi, 1998, pp. 14, his emphasis). Say that 
if the threat is effectuated it costs 1 value for the target. The benefit the target gets 
from business-as-usual policies must then be less than 1 value for the threat to be 
severe enough. If the target‘s benefit from business-as-usual policies is higher than 1 
value, it will be more beneficial for the target to continue those policies than comply 
with the threat. Thus the threat is not severe enough. In my case the LTTE must have 
its incentive-structure altered so as to prefer no violent action and no proscription, over 
continuing violent action and being proscribed. The sanctions of the proscription must 
be tough enough for the incentive-structure to be altered before we can say that it is 
severe. 
 Thirdly, for the threat to be effective it must be credible.  This basically means 
that ―the credibility of a threat is the extent to which the target believes it will be 
carried out if the relevant transgression takes place‖ (Hovi, 1998, pp. 15). The 
credibility of the threat can thus be looked at as a function of the threatener‘s 
capabilities and preferences, or more precisely, the target‘s perception of them. If the 
target finds the threat credible, then it is credible. In my case this means that the LTTE 
believes that the US, EU, Sri Lankan national government, etc. will carry out the threat 
of proscription if the LTTE does not comply with their demands.  
 Fourthly, the threat must be complete. According to Hovi a threat is complete if 
the target believes that if it complies the threat will not be effectuated. Meaning that ―a 
threat must be accompanied by an explicit or implicit promise that the threated action 
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will be called off if the target complies‖ (Hovi, 1998, pp. 15). If this is the case the 
threat is complete. In my case this means that the LTTE must have believed that if they 
stopped violent action (or similar demands), then they would not be proscribed, or de-
proscribed by the ones who had already done so.  
 Lastly, for a threat to be effective it must be sufficiently clear. For a threat to be 
clear it has to tell the target exactly what the threatener wants from the target in terms 
of behavior, it has to be properly communicated to the target, and the target has to 
understand what the consequences of not complying are (Hovi, 1998, pp. 16). If these 
three factors are met, then the threat can be said to be clear. In my case this means that 
it must have been properly communicated to the LTTE from the different actors what 
they demanded from the LTTE in terms of behavior for not being proscribed, or de-
proscribed, and what the actual consequences would be if they did not comply with the 
demands. If this was the case then the threat, or promise, would be sufficiently clear. 
 Later in the thesis I analyze the relevant parts of the case with this theoretical 
framework, to try and understand to what degree the threat of proscription (and 
reversely, the promise of being de-proscribed) can be said to have been an effective 
tool. Which conditions were in effect, and which were not? What can this explain to us 
about the way in which terrorist proscription functioned as a tool for altering the 
LTTE‘s incentive-structure and thus represented an effective mechanism for creating 
peace in the Sri Lankan peace process? 
 
 Combined Analytical Approach 3.4
What is to be gained by using these two theoretical approaches on the same case? The 
Hovi theory will be used to analyze the parts of the case where threats and promises of 
proscription or de-proscription are relevant. How were the proscriptions used as a 
mechanism according to Hovi‘s five conditions for it to be an effective tool? Are 
terrorist proscriptions inherently negative for creating peace as Haspeslagh‘s theory 
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seems to imply, or could they be a constructive mechanism for affecting a change 
towards a peaceful track if used effectively?  
Haspeslagh‘s theory is more useful analyzing the way the proscription affected 
the peace process once they were in effect, meaning the way the proscriptions affected 
the framework for the peace process. How did the proscriptions affect the roles that 
third-party actors should play in order to create a constructive peace process? These 
theoretical contributions might together uncover a broader and more complementary 
set of analytically interesting findings from the case, whilst always maintaining the 
focus on the use and effects of the terrorist proscriptions on the peace process. 
Together, they can also create the opportunity for finding answers both positive and 
negative concerning the impact of proscriptions on peace processes. This combined 
approach should yield a more complete analysis of the proscriptions‘ impact. Thus I 
can draw more valid inferences about the research question of to what degree this 
impact helps explain the failure of the 5
th
 Sri Lankan peace process.  
 
 Other Relevant Contributions to the Literature 3.5
In this last part of the chapter I briefly look at some of the other relevant perspectives 
that exist on the subject, illustrated through four contributions that can succinctly 
explain these perspectives. These contributions will not necessarily influence my 
thesis directly but they demonstrate where the academic field is at the present time and 
increase my general understanding of the issue, thus indirectly aiding me and the 
readers.  
I begin my review of literature by looking at a contribution from a former 
Norwegian diplomat with considerable experience in the field of peace processes. This 
contribution exemplifies the way several scholars have examined the negative impact 
of the post-9/11 era‘s policies and environment on peace processes. The contribution is 
by the former state secretary in the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs Vidar 
Helgesen, and is poignantly entitled ‗How Peace Diplomacy Lost Post 9/11‘ (2007). 
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The contribution considers the effect that the attacks on the US in 2001 have had on 
peace diplomacy. The effect is neatly summed up by Helgesen in this extract: 
Though the nineties were a golden decade for peace diplomacy, the situation changed 
after September 11
th
 2001. Non-state parties to a number of internal conflicts have 
been labeled terrorist organizations, and the international community has tended to 
address such conflicts just as situations of one state fighting against terrorism. Instead, 
many internal, asymmetrical conflicts should be seen as cases of unfinished or 
incomplete state-building processes, and the international response should be one of 
supporting restructuring of the state to ensure all parts of society are included. This 
would require a willingness from governments to engage in asymmetrical diplomacy, 
implying negotiation with terrorists. International anti-terrorism measures have 
significantly constrained efforts to negotiate peace (2007, pp. 4). 
Helgesen argues that global security realities greatly affect the possibilities for success 
of peace diplomacy, and that these realities often are outside the control of the parties 
in the conflict, as well as the third-parties trying to help. In 2007, he writes, the 
dominant global security issue was the issue of terrorism and how to deal with it 
(2007, pp. 6). The measures taken against terrorism have not sufficiently differentiated 
between global terrorism and the use of violence in national contexts. This flaw has 
―had an adverse impact on conditions for peace negotiations… making the resolution 
of internal conflicts more difficult‖ (Helgesen, 2007, pp. 6).  
 The next perspective I present explains the way terrorist proscriptions 
negatively constrain the potential for engagement with armed groups. The contribution 
that exemplifies this is from Joshua Gross. In it he analyzes the way terrorist lists 
complicated the US‘ ability to impact the situation between the government and the 
Maoists group in Nepal (Gross, 2011). Gross recounts the impact of the US Supreme 
Court decision in Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project which ruled that training or 
advice to proscribed groups is illegal even if it is with the intentions to create peace 
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(2011, pp. 49-50). This ruling on material support does not exempt members of the 
diplomatic community in the US (ibid, pp. 44).  
 The legislation surrounding the proscription of a group isolates, in this case, the 
US from peace processes. And as Gross analyzes it, in Nepal ―the U.S. was absent 
from the table when it needed to be present…‖(2011, pp. 46). Gross argues that: 
The language and mindset of counterterrorism… is an impediment to the U.S.‘ ability 
to analyze the likelihood that the Maoists could moderate and evolve into a legitimate 
political party. The U.S. experience in Nepal demonstrates how labeling a group as a 
terrorist entity and cutting of the possibility for engagement can become a self-
fulfilling prophecy, neutralizing incentives for an armed group to undergo the difficult 
transformation to become a legitimate and nonviolent political party (2011, pp. 39).     
The next perspective I present explains the way the unclear nature of terrorist 
proscriptions makes it difficult for those government officials and NGOs engaging 
with proscribed groups to know what is legal and illegal. The contribution that 
exemplifies this is by Noah Bialostozky (2011). He argues that the proscription 
legislation and its unclearness ―have resulted in significant legal uncertainties for those 
who engage with such organizations [as proscribed groups] to promote peace‖ 
(Bialostozky, 2011, pp. 59). And in addition that ―both U.S. and international material 
support of terrorism measures fail to account for the on-the-ground realities of 
humanitarian and peacemaking work, and thereby create undue liability risks for a 
variety of public and private actors in conflict situations…‖ (ibid). Bialostozky argues 
that the international counterterrorist measures need much more precision and nuance, 
as in the present circumstance many actors are unsure of the legality of their actions, 
and they are therefore less likely to engage in peace building activities (2011). 
 The final perspective I present explains the question of legitimacy in regards to 
armed groups. More specifically the possible impact the naming of an armed group as 
terrorists has on their potential path toward transformation into a peaceful political 
party. The contribution is by Harmonie Toros (2008). She writes that her article has:  
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… questioned the politics of naming groups as ‗terrorist‘. Indeed, the terrorist 
designation is often precisely an attempt to delegitimize a group, isolating it, 
potentially radicalizing it, and crucially closing off non-violent paths. Reducing a 
group or movement to its terrorist acts, which often do not even represent the main 
activity of the group, limits the group‘s possibilities of being anything but a ‗terrorist 
group‘. It also limits how the state can engage with such groups, putting decision 
makers in a ‗policy straightjacket‘(Toros, 2008, pp. 422).  
This process of proscription and de-legitimization is due to the governments being 
afraid that talking to violent groups will legitimize their goals and means. But Toros 
argues that ―negotiation with ‗terrorists‘ can indeed lead to their legitimation, but 
through this very legitimation it may offer ‗terrorists‘ an alternative path and the 
chance to transform into nonviolent actors‖(2008, pp. 422). This dynamic is evident in 
cases such as the republican movement in Northern Ireland and the Maoists in Nepal.  
 It is worth noting that all these perspectives have something in common. They 
are all concerned with the negative impact that terrorist proscriptions have on the 
engagement of proscribed armed groups. Although there are some that have written of 
ways the proscription can have a positive impact, this is almost exclusively in 
contributions that are in the main negative towards the consequences of proscription. 
This is one of the reasons why I believe it is important for me to analyze the case with 
Jon Hovi‘s theory on threats and promises, as my use of the theory is neutral towards 
the potential effects of the proscriptions being negative or positive. Although the 
consequences of the proscriptions seem to be mainly negative towards engagement 
with armed groups, the proscriptions could perhaps work as threats or promises to 
influence the groups to move away from violence.    
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4 Research Design and Methodology 
In the introduction I tersely presented the type of case my research design consists of, 
and briefly outlined my two main methods of data collection: literature studies and 
semi-structured interviews. I begin this chapter by discussing the selection of 
respondents that I interviewed. Then I examine the strengths and weaknesses of my 
research design in regards to the issues of reliability and validity. My aim is to make 
this a brief chapter, but one that covers the important topics I have outlined.  
 
 Respondents 4.1
The respondents I have selected for the semi-structured interviews all had some part to 
play or interest in the 5
th
 Sri Lankan peace process. They are mainly persons who were 
Norwegian government officials at the time, under titles such as ambassadors, state 
secretaries, special advisors etc. In addition I have interviewed the then-LTTE press 
liaison, members of academia, and a former US ambassador to Sri Lanka, so as to gain 
a variety of insights from both different professions and countries. I have not been able 
to interview LTTE leaders or cadres as those who would have been relevant to 
interview are either dead or in prison. Thankfully I was able to interview Sutha 
Nadarajah who was press liaison for the LTTE delegation during the Norwegian-
facilitated negotiations in 2002-3. He was also then editor of the Tamil Guardian 
newspaper to which the LTTE chief negotiator and political strategist, Anton 
Balasingham, gave the majority of his extended interviews between 2000 and 2006. 
Nadarajah therefore had insight into the group‘s thinking during the peace process. 
Interviewing members of the Sri Lankan government would have been difficult, as 
when a Norwegian research team tried to do this a few years ago they were refused 
interviews and research visas (Goodhand, Klem & Sørbø, 2011). Luckily, my research 
question can be answered without access to Sri Lanka, as I am focusing mainly on the 
international dimension of the peace process.  
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I used the selection approach of non-probability sampling when choosing my 
respondents, in addition to snowball sampling where it was helpful. The non-
probability method I used was purposive sampling, by which ―the study‘s purpose and 
the researcher‘s knowledge of the population guide the process‖ (Tansey, 2007, pp. 
770). When I was doing my initial research on the background information of my case, 
I noted down all the persons who seemed to be of relevance, and then contacted them 
for interviews. I believe this gave me a relevant and varied set of respondents. The 
other selection method I used was snowball sampling. This method is used by asking 
the initial set of respondents to suggest other potential subjects that have relevance to 
the object of study (Tansey, 2007, pp. 770). This is a good way of reaching 
respondents whose relevance might be more difficult to ascertain at the outset of the 
sampling. Also, when attempting to get a respondent to accept to do an interview I 
found that it was a nice ice-breaker to inform them that they had been suggested by 
others where this was the case.  
The main advantages of these types of non-probability sampling are that they 
give the researcher control over the selection process, and make sure that important 
actors are included in the set of respondents (Tansey, 2007, pp. 769). I feel these 
advantages were achieved through my methods of sampling, as I was able to interview 
several crucial respondents that might have been lost to me in a probability sample. 
The main disadvantages are the increased risk of selection bias and the decreased 
potential to generalize from the sample to the wider population (Tansey, 2007, pp. 
769). The risk of selection bias is present when using non-probability sampling, but I 
believe I have averted this problem by choosing respondents that are obviously 
relevant and by interviewing both a Tamil and representatives of other nations to have 
a variety of backgrounds. If I have a selection bias in my set of respondents, it is 
mainly the bias of having chosen many Norwegians as respondents. Their selection is 
of course partly out of convenience to my location, but they are all chosen for their 
relevance and insight in the peace process.  
My aim is to have used the answers from my interviews with the respondents in 
the most honest and responsible way. I have sent every quote to them for review 
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before publication and only minor alterations were requested, something I take as an 
indication of a reliable use of their views.  
 
 Validity 4.2
In this section of the chapter I discuss the validity of my analytical findings. I structure 
the discussion around Cook and Campbell‘s system of validity, which for my purposes 
includes internal validity, construct validity, and external validity (Lund, 2002, pp. 
105). There is a fourth type of validity in their system that concerns statistical validity 
but as my study is qualitative in nature I have no need to discuss this type of validity.  
 
4.2.1 Internal Validity 
Internal validity concerns whether the relationship between the variables in the study 
can be interpreted causally as the impact of the independent variable on the dependent 
(Lund, 2002, pp. 106). In my case, the question of internal validity is about whether 
the terrorist proscriptions (X) actually impacted negatively on the chances for a 
negotiated peace treaty (Y) in the 5
th
 Sri Lankan peace process. The question of 
correctly attributing the effects on the chances of reaching a peace treaty to the 
proscriptions is the main challenge to the internal validity. 
 Peace processes are often very complex and multi-faceted, and the process on 
Sri Lanka was no exception. Correctly dissecting and attributing the effects I am 
interested in is therefore difficult but extremely important for my conclusions to have 
high internal validity. Thus it is appropriate that my research design consists of a 
theory-guided single-case study. This type of study is thought of as having strong 
potential for internal validity compared to other non-experimental research methods, 
as single-case studies allow for in-depth research of processes and causal mechanisms 
(Gerring, 2007, pp. 43). Having chosen a single-case study with semi-structured elite 
interviews as my research design, I could ask my knowledgeable respondents very 
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specific questions about a defined topic. This should increase my ability to analyze 
causal mechanisms, and therefore the internal validity of my research. The increase in 
internal validity though usually comes with the cost of a decrease in the external 
validity, a point I return to in-depth in section 4.2.3. 
 
4.2.2 Construct Validity 
Construct validity concerns the question of whether one measures what one indeed 
intends to measure. For the construct validity to be considered high, the 
operationalized variables must contain all the aspects of the concept the researcher 
wishes to measure, but nothing else (Lund, 2002, pp. 120).  
Using semi-structured interviews as the research method should be an 
advantage in this regard, as open-ended questions provide the respondents with more 
freedom and thus increase the validity of their answers (Aberbach & Rockman, 2002, 
pp. 674). The somewhat conversational nature of this interview style allows the space 
and flexibility for clearing up any potential misconceptions about what the interviewer 
or respondent means by a concept or a point they raise. This should increase the 
construct validity, as different notions between the interviewer and respondent of what 
a concept means should be more easily avoided than they would with close-ended 
questions. Thus when interviewing I could explain to my respondents what I meant by 
a certain concept in a question if I felt it was necessary, or ask them a follow-up 
question to ensure we were in agreement on the meaning of their response. I believe 
this interviewing style decreased the potential for misunderstandings, and therefore 
increased the construct validity of the information I received from my interviews.  
My analytical approach contains several concepts, and it is therefore important 
that these concepts are measured in a way that ensures high construct validity. 
Concepts such as access are fairly straight-forward and should not yield much 
problem. But concepts such as severity, which I use when assessing the effect of the 
threat of proscriptions with Jon Hovi‘s framework, can be more difficult to correctly 
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measure. I therefore argue for a two-part analysis of the concept looking at the 
material and ideational effects separately, to analyze more correctly the proper extent 
of the severity concept. Dividing this into two sub-concepts for my questions to the 
respondents, I avoid a situation where they answer for example, ‗the effects were not 
severe‘. And they actually believe the ideational effects were severe, but assumed I 
meant to ask only of the material effects, which were not severe. Being aware of 
potential snares such as this is important, as the researcher can then adapt the interview 
in a way that yields the highest possible construct validity. To avoid these traps is a 
challenge, but it is something I was aware of and therefore it was hopefully avoided as 
best can be. 
 
4.2.3 External Validity 
A study can be considered to have high external validity if it makes it possible to 
generate non-statistical generalizations to and across relevant individuals, situations or 
times with a reasonable degree of certainty (Lund, 2002, pp. 121). In my thesis there is 
only a limited opportunity for making generalizations, and I have no great ambition of 
doing this either. Single-case studies usually mean prioritizing internal and construct 
validity over external validity, and my study is no exception. This trade-off between 
external and internal validity seems ―intrinsic to the cross-case/single-case choice of 
research design‖ (Gerring, 2007, pp. 43).  
 Peace processes are inherently complex and to a degree unique, and lessons 
learned from one process can therefore be difficult to apply to another process. To take 
knowledge of one process as generalized knowledge of all processes could soon be at 
one‘s peril, especially for mediators, but also for academic analysts. Therefore I should 
be very careful and frugal when assessing the external validity of my findings. The 
possibility for generalizing across time is also an important question, as the ideational 
impact of terrorist proscription, and the word: ‗terrorist‘ itself, was probably stronger 
in the decade after 9/11 than it will be in the next decade. But the mechanism of 
terrorist proscription does not seem likely to go away any time soon, and the number 
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of intra-state conflicts has stabilized at a high frequency (―Intrastate Conflict by the 
Numbers,‖ 2013). Therefore the study of the impact of terrorist proscriptions on peace 
processes should remain highly relevant in the foreseeable future, even though the 
impact of the proscriptions themselves might decline somewhat if the world goes for a 
long time without major terrorist attacks.  
 Does my study have high external validity? I would say it does not. This is 
mainly due to the limiting nature of single-case studies in this regard, and the inherent 
complexity of peace processes. I would argue, though, that my analytical framework 
could be relevant for analyzing similar types of peace processes as the one in Sri 
Lanka. 
 
 Reliability 4.3
The question of reliability is the question of to what degree we can place confidence in 
the measuring instrument we are using to give the same results, if it were to be 
repeated on the same object of study (King, Keohane, & Verba, 1994, pp. 25-26). The 
interview methods typically associated with high reliability are variations of the 
method of structured interviewing, these forms contain standardized ways of asking 
and recording the questions and answers and are often used in surveys (Bryman, 2004, 
pp. 109-110 ). Unstructured interviews on the other hand are difficult to replicate, and 
are therefore associated with low reliability.  
 The interview method I have chosen is semi-structured interviews. As I have 
argued previously, this seemed most appropriate for the flexibility and in-depth 
research my study necessitated. This method of interviewing lands somewhere in the 
middle in regards to reliability, as the fixed interview guide of questions increases the 
reliability, but the flexible nature of the semi-structured interview decreases the 
possibility of replication (Bryman, 2004, pp. 321). Therefore the reliability of my 
study should have a moderate degree of reliability, although not as high as a structured 
interview method might potentially have yielded.  
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 There are also various other steps I have taken to increase the reliability of my 
study. These are among others that my interviews have all been recorded with a tape 
recorder; the interviews have been transcribed in some detail; my interview guide is 
documented and published; I have had each respondent review my citations before 
publication; and my respondents are exclusively cited by name and not anonymized. 
All these measures, especially when combined, should increase the reliability of my 
study. The fact that some of the interviews are translated from Norwegian could 
decrease the reliability, but as every translated quote is reviewed by the respondents I 
believe any potential mistakes should be avoided. 
 ―Interviewers must always keep in mind that it is not the obligation of a subject 
to be objective and to tell us the truth‖ (Berry, 2002, pp. 680). This is an important 
thing to keep in mind when examining the reliability of the answers from my 
respondents. Several of the respondents were heavily involved in the peace process 
(which ended badly), and might therefore consciously or unconsciously present their 
views in a way that reflect better upon themselves. The fact that my analysis is 
concerned with the impact of external actions, rather than the performance of 
individual persons, should alleviate this potential problem. Still, I must be aware of 
this issue and will therefore base my analysis on a variety of sources. This way I can 
avoid a negative effect on the reliability of my analysis caused by an undue reliance on 
potentially unreliable answers. I should add that my impression is that all the 
respondents answered my questions truthfully and objectively.  
 This chapter has discussed the strengths and weaknesses of my research design. 
It consists of doing a theory-guided single-case study of the 5
th
 Sri Lankan peace 
process, with semi-structured interviews and literature studies as its two main methods 
of data collection. In short, the main strengths of this design are the increased chances 
of achieving the identification of causal mechanisms, and to correctly capture and 
measure the concepts I wished to measure. These strengths pertain to high internal 
validity and construct validity. The main weakness on the other hand, is the 
constrained opportunity for making generalizations, which indicates that the external 
validity of the study is limited. The reliability of the study can be considered moderate, 
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as several measures are implemented to increase it, but the nature of semi-structured 
interviews means the reliability will be lower than compared to a study conducted 
through structured interviews.  
 This kind of trade-off between the different types of validity through my choice 
of research design is as old as academia itself, and one will always be forced to make 
choices of whether to ―know more about less, or less about more‖ (Gerring, 2007, pp. 
49). As I have argued throughout the discussion of my research design, though, I 
believe my choices have been the most appropriate ones when attempting to answer 
my research question. One is always faced with choices, so therefore the best one can 
do is to try and make the most suitable ones. 
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5 The Impact of the Proscriptions on the 
Framework of the Peace Process 
In this chapter I make use of the theory by Sophie Haspeslagh to analyze the way in 
which the proscriptions affected the framework for the peace process, using the 
variables expounded in her theory as explained in chapter 3. I begin by analyzing the 
impact the proscriptions had on the peace process through Haspeslagh‘s two main 
variables, access and trust, before analyzing the way these variables affected the four 
roles of third-party actors.    
 
 Access 5.1
The first of Haspeslagh‘s two main variables is access. It is important as without 
access it is very difficult to engage and affect the parties in a conflict and an ensuing 
peace process. How did the proscriptions affect the access actors had to the LTTE in 
the peace process on Sri Lanka? I begin by looking at the access of, in my view, the 
six main actors at the time of the start of the formal peace process in early 2002. 
 The most important actor was the government of Sri Lanka (GoSL). The LTTE 
were initially proscribed by the GoSL in 1998, but were de-proscribed as a result of 
the peace process in September 2002 during the six rounds of formal talks. As the 
Cease-Fire Agreement was signed before the LTTE were lifted off the ban it is 
clear that it was possible to engage them before this, but the LTTE demanded de-
proscription as a necessity for further talks, and in this sense the de-proscription 
was necessary for the access of the GoSL to the LTTE (and vice versa). In the 
words of Sutha Nadarajah, former editor of the Tamil Guardian and press liaison 
for the LTTE delegation: ―the Sri Lankan ban was fundamental; the LTTE would 
never have negotiated without being de-proscribed by Sri Lanka, as this was a 
minimum of legitimacy for the negotiations themselves‖ (Interview). Thus the 
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national proscription and subsequent de-proscription seems to have had a direct 
impact on the access between the parties. 
 
 Norway was the facilitator of the peace process and it was therefore necessary for 
them to not proscribe the LTTE. In the words of Norway‘s special representative 
Erik Solheim: ―If Norway wanted to play this sort of role in Sri Lanka, and want to 
in other conflicts, they must forget about a terrorist list like this‖ (Interview). 
Subsequently there were no problems of access for Norway due to proscription; 
this decision not to proscribe was even strongly encouraged by the United States so 
as to make sure someone was able to talk to the LTTE (Solheim, Interview). 
Norway‘s decision to no longer align themselves with the EU list after the EU 
proscribed the LTTE in 2006 gives a further indication of the significance of non-
proscription for their ability to act as a facilitator. This was done to ―avoid a 
situation that makes it more difficult for us to have contact with any of the parties 
to a conflict‖ (―Norway‘s cooperation with the EU on the fight against terrorism,‖ 
2006).   
 
 The world‘s only superpower is arguably still the United States (and it undoubtedly 
was in 2002), which therefore has a lot of potential impact on pretty much any 
peace process around the world. Although the Americans had no strong strategic 
interest in Sri Lanka they had an enhanced engagement from 2001 and onwards, at 
least as long as the process showed some progress (Lunstead, 2007, pp. 13). How 
did their proscription of the LTTE on the previously discussed FTO list affect their 
access to the LTTE? For the Americans there was no direct contact with the LTTE 
through any channel, which was not due to a legal restriction but a policy decision 
(Lunstead, 2007, pp.15). Although there were legal restrictions as a consequence of 
the FTO list that were discussed in chapter 2.7, the decision not to meet with the 
LTTE was heavily influenced by the post-9/11 atmosphere. At this time it was a 
―political impossibility for the US to be in direct contact with a designated terrorist 
organization‖ (Lunstead, 2007, pp. 16). Instead they relied on Norway to be the 
middleman for communicating messages to the LTTE (Solheim, Interview).  
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       The US restrictions on access had a direct effect when a donor conference 
was scheduled in Washington DC in 2003. The LTTE could not attend due to the 
US‘ legislative restrictions on their access to US soil. The LTTE subsequently 
suspended their participation in the formal talks of the peace process, citing their 
exclusion as one of the reasons (Weerakoon, 2006, pp. 22). Although there were 
probably several other factors influencing this decision by the LTTE, their 
exclusion from the conference gave them a ―legitimate out‖ from the process, 
which ―proved to be a turning point in a negative direction‖ (Stokke, Interview).   
 
 The UK also played a part in the peace process, as an important actor on the 
international stage, as well as a history as Sri Lanka‘s former colonial master. They 
had proscribed the LTTE in 2001, but had a more flexible approach to access with 
the group than that the US had (Stokke, Interview). To illustrate, the LTTE‘s chief 
negotiator Anton Balasingham lived in London and met with UK officials there, 
but could not receive colleagues from the LTTE there and had to go all the way to 
LTTE-held Vanni in Sri Lanka to communicate personally (Sutha Nadarajah, 
Interview). This shows that the UK had some access to the LTTE, and that 
curiously the ban delayed the internal decision process in the LTTE through the 
effect on access of the UK proscription.  
 
 The EU did not proscribe the LTTE until 2006, so they had access to the group in 
principle until then. The only high-profile meeting between an EU official and the 
LTTE leader Prabhakaran was however when the Commissioner for External 
Relations Chris Patten went to Sri Lanka in late 2003. This meeting caused some 
stirrings in the EU (Vidar Helgesen, Interview). There were some meetings 
between middle-rank delegates from the LTTE with European officials in EU 
countries, but Patten‘s visit was the only high profile visit with the military 
leadership of the LTTE. The EU proscribed the LTTE in 2006, cutting off access 
for officials from the EU countries to the LTTE (Helgesen, Interview). 
Furthermore, the EU proscription led directly to the LTTE demanding that the EU 
countries (Sweden, Denmark, and Finland) participating in the Sri Lanka 
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Monitoring Mission (SLMM) to withdraw from Sri Lanka. This restriction on 
access and trust from the EU proscription had the effect that the SLMM was 
weakened, as only Iceland and Norway remained (Solheim, Interview).  
 
 India played a part in the peace process through their power, geographical 
closeness, and cultural and political ties to Sri Lanka. India had proscribed the 
LTTE in the early 1990‘s so could not meet with the LTTE officially (Rupesinghe, 
2006, pp. li). Although the LTTE were proscribed by India, ―there was a running 
back-channel of dialogue between the two actors‖, which showed that India were 
more flexible in practice than in theory at least in the early part of the process (Jon 
Westborg, Interview). The proscription therefore had a moderately negative effect 
on India‘s access to the LTTE. 
No access Some access Full access 
US, EU (post-2006) GoSL (pre-2001), UK, 
India, EU (pre-2006) 
GoSL (post-2001), 
Norway 
Figure 3: Table of actors‘ access to the LTTE 
 
The effect the proscriptions had on the access of the different actors can be 
illustrated in the communication chart in figure 4 by the time of the EU 
proscription in 2006. The arrows represent the lines of communication between the 
actors, with the grey arrows signifying the GoSL and the black arrows the other 
actors. The thickness of the lines signifies the extent of the communication. The 
most significant point to keep in mind for the rest of the analysis is the way the 
communication between Prabhakaran and the international actors became filtered 
and indirect. This would serve the effect of the international actors‘ engagement 
with him and the LTTE negatively.     
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Figure 4: Graphic representation of communication between the LTTE and other actors.  
 Trust 5.2
The second main intermediate variable in Haspeslagh‘s theory is trust. Trust between 
the actors is necessary in a peace process for constructive engagement to happen. The 
perceived impartiality of third-party actors is closely linked, and an essential 
component of trust-building (Haspeslagh, 2013, pp. 198). As trust is an ideational 
variable it is more difficult to analyze than the more straight-forward access variable I 
previously examined. It should however still be possible to say something valid about 
the way in which it was affected by the proscriptions, as long as I am careful not to 
reach too far in my inferences.  
 I begin the analysis of this variable by reminding the readers that it would have 
been ―impossible‖ for Norway to engage in the process if they had proscribed the 
LTTE, ―as our role necessitated trust from both parties in the conflict‖ (Tore Hattrem, 
Interview). Additionally it was necessary for the LTTE to be de-proscribed nationally 
in Sri Lanka. As the LTTE were supposed to be an ordinary political actor in the peace 
process they could not be banned nationally, as this would have created an imbalance 
between the two parties in the conflict (Solheim, Interview). It is precisely concerning 
this balance of legitimacy where the proscriptions from the international actors seem 
to have had an effect on the trust variable, as I shall now elaborate on. 
 For the LTTE, questions of honor, equality, and equal treatment was very 
important, in every detail and in every way (Solheim, Interview). The LTTE talked all 
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the time of their legitimate right to be treated equally with the Sri Lankan state, as the 
LTTE (at least in their opinion) represented the Tamil nation, and ―when the 
proscriptions revealed to them that the Western actors treated them systematically 
different it led to a feeling of betrayal towards these actors‖ (Stokke, Interview). A 
crucial aspect in any conflict is how we should understand it. According to Sutha 
Nadarajah, ―a key consequence with using proscription and the terrorist label on an 
organization, especially in the context where other Tamil actors are endorsing them 
and their political agenda, is that you are already taking a side in the fundamental 
question of the conflict‖ (Interview). This way, ―the proscription in itself says that the 
conflict should be understood as a conflict between a legitimate state and an 
illegitimate group. That is the political impact of proscription on its most foundational 
level‖ (Nadarajah, Interview). After the EU proscription in 2006, the LTTE ―became 
more introvert and more skeptical of international engagement, and politically there 
was an increasing marginalization of the group; in this context the proscriptions were 
very destructive‖ (Helgesen, Interview).  
  When analyzing this variable it is important to keep in mind the discursive 
context of the world this peace process took place in. Although no more than roughly a 
decade has passed since the apex of the process, the discourse surrounding terrorism is 
softer now than compared to a decade ago. Arguably, the pattern of the discursive 
impact of the word ‗terrorist‘ coincided almost perfectly with the peace process itself, 
peaking from 2001-2003 and tailing off until 2009, when the conflict ended on Sri 
Lanka and the newly inaugurated Barack Obama retired the term ‗War on Terror‘ in 
exchange for ―overseas contingency operations‖ (Wilson & Kamen, 2009). In fact he 
has almost never uttered the phrase in his presidency (―Tim Pawlenty says Obama has 
stopped using the phrase ‗war on terror‘-fact check,‖ 2011). But in the atmosphere 
after the 11
th
 September attacks, things were different. In this period: 
The notion of a single huge threat returned as the organizing principle of foreign 
policy. …the security agendas and the decision-making processes of the most 
influential governments and key international organizations like the UN, the EU and 
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NATO were focused almost exclusively on terrorism and the need to combat it 
(Helgesen, 2007, pp. 9).    
It was at this time and in this context that the peace process took place, and therefore 
most likely increasing the impact of the proscriptions on the trust variable compared to 
other time periods. As it was put by Sutha Nadarajah, ―given the global mood at the 
time, when you say terrorism it puts the group concerned totally and utterly beyond the 
pale. The discursive power of that word was at its strongest in the crucial stages of the 
process‖ (Interview). Thus, the ‗War on Terror‘: ―decreased strongly the will to equate 
a guerrilla movement with the government of a state, and the proscriptions were part 
of this big picture‖ (Solheim, Interview). 
The struggle for legitimacy and balance, both nationally and internationally, 
was of crucial importance for the LTTE, and the proscriptions seemingly affected the 
prospective balance between the government of Sri Lanka and the LTTE. ―The 
legitimization effect from the proscriptions handed wholesale the advantage to the 
government as the aggrieved party in the conflict. In short, any problems with the 
peace process were easily blamed on the (illegitimate) LTTE, and not the (legitimate) 
government‖ (Nadarajah, Interview). For a peace process to be constructive and 
progressive it is critical for there to be trust between the parties. In the Sri Lankan 
peace process ―the level of trust was very fragile at the outset and it withered 
gradually, and the EU proscription was perhaps, an important part of, a last nail in the 
coffin regarding this from the point of view of the LTTE‖ (Stokke, Interview).  
 
 The Four Roles of Third-Party Actors 5.3
In the next section of the chapter I analyze how the levels of access and trust affected 
the four roles that third-party actors can engage in to create a more constructive peace 
process according to Haspeslagh‘s framework. The reduced levels of both access and 
trust impacted this, although the variable of access played the largest part. The 
proscriptions‘ impact on the trust variable appears to have affected the chances for a 
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peace agreement in a more direct manner, while the impact on the access variable 
affected the chances for a peace agreement indirectly through its impact on the four 
roles. The indirect impact of the reduced levels of trust appears especially salient on 
the third role of affecting strategic calculations. The four roles are: understanding 
armed groups, influencing them, affecting their strategic calculations, and training 
them in conflict resolution. I analyze them one by one, but focus on them according to 
their significance for the case. 
 
5.3.1 Understanding the LTTE 
Without being able to understand armed groups any engagement with them are not 
likely to be especially fruitful. Haspeslagh explains that ―challenges around access to 
groups [can] have led to problems for third-party actors to gather enough information 
to help them understand groups‘ perspectives, motivations and dynamics‖ (2013, pp. 
199). Does proscription affect this ability through the proscriptions, and was this the 
case in Sri Lanka? Vidar Helgesen has argued that ―probably no other government 
[than the Norwegian] has maintained contact with so many rebel movements and 
leaders, and accumulated such an understanding of their mentality, political outlook 
and organizations‖ (2007, pp. 20). If we take this statement at face value, is it just a 
coincidence that one of the few Western nations with an outspoken policy of non-
proscription is also one of the countries with the greatest understanding of the 
mentality of armed groups around the world? Or perhaps this is not a coincidence. I 
believe it is reasonable to make the inference that proscribing groups reduce the access 
to them, and that there is a connection between the ability to have access to these 
groups and the ability to understand them.  
 Did this connection appear in Sri Lanka? NGOs and government agencies 
focused on development can often play an important part during peace processes, and 
can be very helpful in getting close and understanding the motivations of groups. But 
they appear to have had a ―limited‖ effect on the Sri Lankan process (Solheim, 
Interview). Even so, Erik Solheim believes this limited engagement and effect of 
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NGOs were mostly due to the LTTE‘s poor ability to sell their message and get 
sympathy abroad (Interview). The proscriptions were more a reflection of this negative 
image of the LTTE in the West, rather than the limited role of NGOs in the process 
being because of the proscriptions. American agencies such as USAID were lawfully 
prohibited from executing development programs in LTTE-controlled areas (Lunstead, 
2007, pp. 19). This might have reduced the economic development in the LTTE-areas, 
which the LTTE leadership was very concerned with and increasingly frustrated with 
the lack of (Helgesen, Interview). This reduction of potential development was 
especially apparent when the US refused to take part in the P-TOMS framework after 
the tsunami, as they did not want funds to go through the LTTE (Nadarajah, 
Interview). This way the proscriptions‘ constraints on access seem to have affected the 
process negatively through the decrease in potential economic development from 
NGOs and government agencies. However, the lack of understanding for the actors 
through the restricted access of NGOs has not been cited as a meaningful negative 
impact on the process in Sri Lanka.  
 How about the government and LTTE representatives taking part in the formal 
peace process? Was the level of understanding between them affected by the 
proscriptions of the LTTE? A problem in the Sri Lankan peace process seems to be 
that the representatives who met with each other, built trust and understood each other, 
were not necessarily the ones which were most crucial for achieving progress in the 
process. During the six rounds of formal talks ―the involved could talk together, there 
was a dialogue, and they could understand each other. A critic would say, however, 
that the LTTE delegation did not really represent the LTTE and partly so also on the 
government side‖ (Stokke, Interview). The delegates taking part in the talks for the 
LTTE were mainly from the political wing of the group, but this wing was 
―increasingly marginalized‖ within LTTE, and there was a problem that the 
international actors ―understood the ones they met at the negotiation table, but less so 
the dynamic around them‖ (Stokke, Interview). This problem cannot however be 
attributed to the proscriptions, as this was not a consequence of reduced access or trust, 
but a free choice for the GoSL and the LTTE of who to send to the negotiations.  
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As the process went on the hard-liners on both sides would increase the 
influence over the process, eventually leading to a return to violence. Thus there was a 
problem of access that meant that the people the western actors met the most and built 
a relationship with, were not the ones that necessarily made the decisions in the LTTE. 
―The proscriptions had the strange effect that one gladly wanted to speak to the 
civilians, but as their power was so limited it would have been much better to talk to 
the ones who made the decisions to kill‖ (Solheim, Interview). This effect for the 
international actors can thus be attributed to the proscriptions, as the reduced access to 
the military wing of the LTTE can have led to a decreased understanding of them. 
 As all the international actors except Norway did not have real access to the 
group, it was very difficult for them to get close to the LTTE and build the necessary 
understanding of their motivations and needs. All communication had to go through 
Norway as an intermediary. More access and therefore a higher level of understanding 
might have made it easier for the actors to shape their strategy in a more constructive 
manner. The result of this somewhat incomplete understanding will perhaps be more 
evident in the next chapter, where I analyze the effect of the threats and promises of 
proscription on the incentive-structure of the LTTE. If the international actors had 
understood the LTTE leadership better, these actors might have adapted their strategy 
in a way that would have had more influence on the decision making of the LTTE.   
But the way the proscriptions affected the ability for third-party actors to understand 
the LTTE does not seem to have affected the process in a very negative way, although 
it might have had some effect in the fashion I explained.                
 
5.3.2 Influencing the LTTE   
The second role third-party actors can play is in influencing the way the armed group 
sees itself and perceives it environment. As many of these groups, including the LTTE, 
are far removed from global politics and ―wider political dynamics‖, third-parties can 
help them open their eyes to new forms of seeing themselves and the world 
(Haspeslagh, 2013, pp. 201). Did the proscriptions have an effect on the ability of 
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third-parties to play this role on Sri Lanka? The answer is partly yes, and I will now 
show why this is so. 
 A good example of the attempt and partial success of third-parties playing this 
role is the ‗federalism tour‘ that several (from junior-level to high-level) LTTE cadres 
went on in Europe to study different governmental structures (―LTTE officials study 
Swiss Federalism,‖ 2002). The only plausible way the Sri Lankan conflict could have 
ended peacefully seems to me to be through a compromise on some form of 
federalism. The GoSL would not have accepted a separate state, and the LTTE would 
need a very strong degree of autonomy to be able to accept and sell the deal to the 
Tamil people. Therefore, some sort of a federal solution seems to have been the only 
negotiable solution (Hattrem, Interview). The ‗federalism tour‘ therefore seems to 
have been a constructive way to engage the group and perhaps facilitate a move in the 
direction of a peaceful compromise. As they were banned in the US and Canada, they 
were unable to research interesting solutions such as the Québécois one. But they were 
able to visit several European countries before the EU proscription in 2006.  
 I have heard the tour described both as ―tactically manipulative and not a 
genuine attempt‖, and as a (genuine) way ―to increase intellectual capacity in the 
LTTE‖ (Hattrem; Nadarajah, Interviews). So how much of a genuine effort this was by 
the LTTE to explore a transformation is hard to decipher, but almost regardless these 
sorts of efforts could be constructive ways of engaging a group and influencing their 
worldview. The apex for this possibility was the press statement after the third round 
of talks in Oslo, known as the Oslo-Communiqué, which said that both parties agreed 
to ―explore federalism‖ as a solution (Goodhand, Klem, & Sørbø, 2011, pp. 41-42). 
Although this proved to be a bridge too far at the time, it was at least discursively an 
option on the table. Efforts such as the federalism tour could only have helped in this 
regard, and access to even more countries could only have improved the process of 
engaging with the LTTE‘s view of the world and their place in it. ―The more open 
doors the better, and the most important role the proscriptions played were in closing 
doors‖ (Solheim, Interview).  
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The LTTE leadership‘s (except the chief-negotiator Balasingham) worldview 
and lack of sophisticated political understanding are mentioned several times in 
interviews as having a negative effect on the process. ―The leadership had limited 
understanding of the outside world, power relationships in the world, and how they 
needed to act get international support‖, their ―very closed world led to a limited 
ability to understand the way their actions affected others‖ (Solheim, Interview). 
Another described it as: ―the LTTE leader Prabhakaran seems to have been completely 
stuck in the jungle. He did not understand how the world operated and was therefore 
not able to adjust to changes on the international stage‖ (Hattrem, Interview). 
Although the former LTTE negotiators‘ press liaison Sutha Nadarajah maintains that 
this ―conception of Prabhakaran sitting in the jungle not understanding the world‖ is 
not correct (citing the LTTE‘s complex political analysis and decision making, to 
which several local and diaspora actors routinely contributed), it seems like several of 
the international facilitators experienced him this way (Interview).  
It appears that one of the main issues of the peace process was to engage the 
way the LTTE saw themselves and the world around them. To change Prabhakaran‘s 
worldview away from a focus on violence would have been ―critical‖ (Helgesen, 
Interview). The engagement by third-parties necessary to achieve this is somewhat 
overlapping between the second and third role in Haspeslagh‘s theory. One needs first 
to influence the group in the manner I have discussed here in order to be able to affect 
the strategic calculations of the group (which is the third role in the theory). Therefore 
I place the analysis of the proscriptions‘ effect on this engagement mainly under the 
next section, as the ultimate goal and need of the engagement is to affect the strategic 
move away from violence and towards peaceful means. This is what was necessary on 
Sri Lanka, and it did not happen. Can the impact of the proscriptions help explain this? 
 
5.3.3 Affecting the Strategic Calculations of the LTTE 
This role is the most crucial one for pretty much any peace process where the 
overarching goal is to transform an armed and violent group into a peaceful political 
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party capable of holding and respecting public office. Everything I have learned about 
the peace process on Sri Lanka seems to back up the necessity of this transformation, 
at least to the degree where a peaceful negotiated solution can be achieved. Aptly 
enough, through my analysis of the impact the proscriptions had on the different roles, 
this is the one where the proscriptions had their biggest impact on the process.  
 This transformation of the LTTE and their strategic calculations is almost 
unanimously cited as the main challenge for the third-party actors. ―In this context [of 
reduced access] the proscriptions were destructive, because political engagement was 
what needed to be done‖ (Helgesen, Interview). The restricted access due to the 
proscriptions made this type of direct engagement next to impossible. The 
proscriptions also contributed to a ―heightened skepticism inside the LTTE towards 
international engagement‖ which affected negatively the levels of trust (Helgesen, 
Interview). The levels of both access and trust seem to have been reduced, and this 
made the effort of affecting the strategic calculations of the LTTE more difficult. The 
main hindrance appears to have been the lack of access; without this any form of 
engagement is extremely challenging, especially an engagement that tries to 
accomplish a transformation of an entrenched group. The reduction of the level of trust 
appears to have been secondary, as access is necessary first to be able to build trust. 
 The potential move away from violence was critical; as ―many felt that the 
LTTE was inherently violent‖ there were still those who felt ―a transformation was 
possible if it had been handled differently‖ (Stokke, Interview). In the words of Erik 
Solheim: ―the most decisive issue [of the process] was the actual use of violence by 
the LTTE‖ (Interview). As the process went on ―the LTTE came to see a violent 
answer to every problem; they had a strong faith in violence as a solution‖ (Solheim, 
Interview). As the ‗law of the instrument‘ goes: If all you have is a hammer, 
everything starts to look like a nail. What the third-parties to the process needed to 
accomplish was to engage the LTTE in a way that made them stop seeing problems as 
nails and themselves as a hammer. They needed more tools, and according to Sophie 
Haspeslagh it was the role of the third-parties to help them get these tools. But the 
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international terrorist proscriptions affected the will and the ability of these actors to 
achieve this.  
 Because actors such as the US, the EU, the UK and India did not have the 
necessary access it was impossible to get close enough to the LTTE to constructively 
engage with them. A problem for the Norwegian delegation was the role diversion 
they experienced, in that they were the mediators of the process as well as the 
intermediary for every (often negative) message from the US and others (Solheim, 
Interview). So it would have been ―a great advantage if others could have contributed 
to the reality orientation of the LTTE. A big, big advantage if the US, the EU and India 
could have met them directly and spoken in clear text‖ (Solheim, Interview). Everyone 
who thinks this transformation was possible believes it would have taken much time 
and effort, with systematics meeting from ambassadors and others with authority. This 
was evident when the EU external relations commissioner Chris Patten was facilitated 
in by Norway (before the EU proscription) and visited the LTTE, which ―had an effect 
and was something the LTTE emphasized greatly‖ (Helgesen, Interview). ―I believe it 
had an important effect that the proscriptions obstructed the political engagement that 
was necessary to open the eyes of Prabhakaran and the LTTE‖ (Helgesen, Interview). 
The proscriptions seem to have played a large role in this context, and the EU 
proscription in 2006 seems especially crucial, as the last major actor not to have 
banned the LTTE before then: 
The outright proscriptions of the LTTE by the EU and Canada in early 2006 
drastically closed the space for engagement between the international community and 
the LTTE. No exception was made in these bans, for example, for engagement with 
the LTTE‘s Political Wing or civil administrative arms. If the intention was to 
encourage the LTTE‘s political transformation (as understood by the international 
community), the move was paradoxical, given that it had been these arms of the LTTE 
which had been interacting most with international actors on transitionary approaches 
and actions. The ban not only disrupted and foreclosed such initiatives, it also 
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undermined advocates of these efforts within the LTTE. Interestingly, while EU 
countries continue to assert their commitment to a negotiated settlement and 
engagement with the LTTE, in practice, the EU‘s 2006 proscription of the movement 
removes the necessary space and suggests this commitment is ambiguous (Nadarajah 
& Vimalarajah, 2008, pp. 45). 
An important point to bring back is something I raised in section 5.3.1, about the 
importance of talking to ‗the right people‘. Understanding and influencing second-rank 
civilian cadres in the LTTE is one thing, but the crucial element is to reach and engage 
with the people that were truly in charge.  
The proscriptions had the strange effect that one gladly wanted to speak to the 
civilians, but as their power was so limited it would have been much better to talk to 
the ones who made the decisions to kill. The important thing was that the proscriptions 
made it more difficult to have a closer and more intimate dialogue with the LTTE, [the 
leader] Prabhakaran in particular, the military core; the ones one needed to influence. 
That would have been the most decisive factor for the entire peace process, and that 
became more difficult with the proscriptions (Solheim, Interview).       
If major international actors had had the necessary access and trust, along with quite a 
lot of will, ability and luck, it might have been possible to achieve the needed 
transformation of the LTTE to a point where a negotiated solution to the conflict might 
have been more achievable. Of course I cannot say with any certainty what could have 
been achieved differently without the constraining effect of the proscriptions, but it 
seems clear to me that the removal of this effect could only have helped the process 
become more constructive, thus increasing the possibility of a peaceful solution. The 
impact of the proscriptions on this role for third-parties is clearly the most salient one 
in Haspeslagh‘s framework when it comes to the Sri Lankan peace process. 
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5.3.4 Training the LTTE in Conflict Resolution 
As poor negotiators can make for poor negotiations, an important function of a peace 
process and the engagement of third-parties can be to train armed groups in 
negotiations and conflict resolution. How did this play out in Sri Lanka, and did the 
proscriptions affect the ability of third-parties to engage?  
 Firstly, one has to remember that armed groups are often just that: an armed 
group, not a democratic political party or a Western-style NGO. Their ability to 
negotiate constructively might be limited. The LTTE had quite a lot of experience 
from different peace processes over the years, but their experience and ability was 
mostly tied up in their chief negotiator Anton Balasingham. The rest of the cadres of 
the political wing of the group were younger and less experienced. Therefore, 
according to Professor G.L Peiris, chief negotiator for the GoSL, the early parts of the 
negotiations needed to go slow. ―As the talks started, the LTTE was naturally reluctant 
to engage, because this was not familiar ground as far as they were concerned. So they 
needed considerable preparation, encouragement, and initiation into the process‖ 
(Peiris in: Rupesinghe, 2006, pp. 96). He goes on to explain how the arrival of several 
academics and NGO workers from Europe and Canada ―greatly assisted‖ this process 
(ibid). It is interesting to note that nationals of the countries that had proscribed the 
group were mostly missing from this picture, whilst most of the present ones were 
from countries such as Canada, Switzerland and some from the EU nations (this 
occurred in the early 2000s before the EU and Canadian proscriptions).  
 The LTTE established a peace secretariat in early 2003, which Kristian Stokke 
describes as one of the basic things necessary for negotiations to be constructive 
(Interview). This seems to have been a step towards increasing the negotiation 
capacity in the LTTE, but discouragingly the secretariat was set up only shortly before 
the formal talks and the peace process were beginning to erode (Goodhand et al., 2011, 
pp. 42). Vidar Helgesen says: ―there were some signs of a buildup of civilian and 
political capacity in the apparatus of the LTTE, which may over time have altered the 
dynamic inside the LTTE [towards peaceful means], but this was dependent on 
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progress in the process‖ (Interview). But as this progress went sorely missing on the 
ground it is hard to say which direction this development might have taken.  
 The chief negotiator for the LTTE, Anton Balasingham, played an important 
part in the process. This was both a strength and a weakness. Balasingham was the 
‗Western alibi‘ inside the LTTE, as he was educated and well-spoken. He was 
someone the international actors ―could talk to‖ and was ―the only one who could 
think independently and who really could argue with Prabhakaran‖ (Stokke; Hattrem, 
Interviews). As I have shown previously, the proscriptions had an effect on who the 
third-parties spoke to, which were mostly Balasingham and to a lesser degree the other 
civilian cadres. This had the negative effects that I analyzed in previous parts of this 
chapter, but another problem was when Balasingham died (from natural causes) in 
2006. His death has been described as one of the final nails in the coffin of the peace 
process; ―the ability for something to happen politically disappeared with him‖ 
(Solheim, Interview). As the major political force in the group was lost with him, it 
suddenly became much more apparent that his presence had papered over the fact that 
the military core had not been sufficiently engaged, and not enough had been done to 
build up the political capacity of the LTTE. According to Erik Solheim, it was ―after 
the death of Balasingham that LTTE made all its mistakes‖, as he was one of the few 
who could argue against Prabhakaran and had the greatest insight into the international 
arena in the LTTE (Norad evalueringsavdelingen, 2011). 
 This dependence on single individuals such as Prabhakaran and Balasingham 
was a problem for the peace process. Had it been possible to do more to build up and 
restructure the political capacity in the LTTE, it would probably have been an 
advantage for the process, especially apparent after the death of Balasingham in 2006. 
In this way the restricted access to the LTTE due to the proscriptions could have had 
an effect on the role of training the LTTE in conflict resolution. But as some countries 
had access and were willing to do this in the important early steps of the peace 
process, the proscriptions did not deny this opportunity entirely.      
  In this chapter I have analyzed the case of the Sri Lankan peace process using 
Sophie Haspeslagh‘s theory of the impact of proscriptions on the four roles third-
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parties can play in engaging an armed group. My findings indicate that the 
proscriptions‘ effect on the first and fourth roles, understanding the LTTE and training 
them in conflict resolution, had a minor negative effect on the attainment of a peace 
treaty. The effect on the second and third role on the other hand, influencing the LTTE 
and affecting their strategic calculations, seems to have had a strong negative impact 
on the process, by denying the opportunity for many crucial actors to engage 
constructively with the LTTE. The reduced levels of both access and trust impacted 
this, although the variable of access played the largest part. The proscriptions‘ impact 
on the trust variable appears to have affected the chances for a peace agreement in a 
more direct manner, while the impact on the access variable affected the chances for a 
peace agreement indirectly through its impact on the four roles. 
 Thus for these actors their communication with the LTTE mainly became the 
proscriptions in themselves. In the next chapter I use Jon Hovi‘s theory on threats to 
analyze to what degree the proscriptions can be said to have been effective in this 
regard, either as the threat of proscription or the promise of de-proscription. The 
analysis through Haspeslagh‘s framework shows the proscriptions had a negative 
effect on the engagement of the LTTE; but were the proscriptions perhaps effective as 
threats and promises, or if they were not, then why? 
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6 The Effectiveness of the Terrorist 
Proscriptions as Threats and Promises 
In the previous chapter I analyzed the impact of the proscriptions on the four roles 
third-parties can perform in a peace process. In this chapter I analyze the proscriptions 
as threats and promises of proscription and de-proscription respectively, and the 
impact this had on the incentive-structure of the LTTE. Jon Hovi argues that a threat 
must satisfy the five conditions of relevance, severity, credibility, completion, and 
clarity for it to be effective. I analyze the proscriptions against the LTTE by going 
through these five conditions one by one, and examining to what degree they were 
present. Where a proscription was already in place it is analyzed with the same 
conditions, as a promise to remove the proscription. A threat and a promise is 
ultimately the same kind of action, just a reversed version.  
Was the proscription mechanism effective in altering the LTTE‘s incentive 
structure and consequently their policy decisions? And where the threats and promises 
were ineffective, was this due to the five conditions stipulated by Hovi not being 
sufficiently fulfilled? According to Jon Hovi‘s theory, if the five conditions were 
fulfilled the threats and promises would be effective in altering the LTTE‘s incentives 
in a way that affected their policies.   
If the proscriptions are to be analyzed for their effectiveness in affecting change 
in behavior, it is important to establish that this was the intention of the actors who 
used them. If the proscribers did not intend for the threats and promises of proscription 
and de-proscription to alter the incentive-structure of the LTTE, then they cannot be 
analyzed in regard to this purpose. I believe though, that is it correct to analyze the 
proscriptions as used for this goal. The policy affecting purpose of the US proscription 
on Sri Lanka was expressed to be for the LTTE to ―renounce terrorism in word and 
deed‖(Lunstead, 2007, pp. 16). The UK Foreign Office minister Mike O‘Brien said 
publicly that for the UK to consider de-proscription ―the LTTE would have to 
demonstrate a complete and convincing renunciation of terrorism‖ (―LTTE has to 
demonstrate complete and convincing renunciation of terrorism to lift ban — UK 
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govt.,‖ 2002). The proscription from India was used for the purpose of encouraging the 
LTTE onto the track of negotiations and a peaceful outcome, whilst some in the EU 
thought they could force the LTTE‘s hand by proscribing them (Westborg, Interview). 
And the Sri Lankan government de-proscribed the LTTE in order to meet the ―crucial 
condition set by the rebels ahead of direct talks‖, and thereby acquiring the LTTE‘s 
presence at the table (Sambandan, 2002). It is clear to me that the proscriptions were 
used by the different actors, at least in part, as an attempt to induce the LTTE to 
change their policy decisions through affecting the LTTE‘s incentive-structure.   
 I learned when analyzing the case with Haspeslagh‘s framework that the third-
parties were crucially unable to move the LTTE away from violent means, and that the 
proscriptions were partially to blame for this. The proscriptions had a negative effect 
on the ability of third-parties to perform the four roles as defined by Haspeslagh, but 
perhaps they worked as a threat to achieve a policy of a peacefully negotiated track by 
the LTTE? My analysis shows that the proscription and subsequent de-proscription of 
the Sri Lankan government were effective in getting the LTTE to hold formal talks at 
the negotiation table. The international actors‘ proscriptions on the other hand were 
ineffective in altering the LTTE‘s incentive structure in favor of using peaceful means 
and renouncing violence. Were the different effects of the GoSL proscription 
compared to the international proscriptions due to the five conditions being fulfilled to 
a different degree in their threats and promises to the LTTE? I will first analyze the 
five conditions separately in turn, and then return to this question in section 6.6 at the 
end of the chapter. 
 
 Relevance 6.1
For the threats and promises of the proscriptions to fulfill the condition of being 
relevant in this case, two aspects must have been present. First, the LTTE must have 
had the freedom of action to move away from violence, ―so that it is possible…to 
adjust [their] policy in the direction prescribed by the threatener‖ (Hovi, 1998, pp. 13). 
Second, the LTTE would have to have ―an incentive to act contrary to the threatheners 
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desires in the first place‖, meaning, did the LTTE have an incentive in continuing to 
use violence and avoid negotiations(Hovi, 1998, pp. 14)? If the LTTE had both of 
these aspects fulfilled, the threats and promises of the proscriptions would have been 
relevant. So, were these aspects present in the LTTE? 
 The first part of the condition first: did the LTTE have a viable option to move 
away from violence? I have heard views on the LTTE as ―violence focused‖, and 
according to Kristian Stokke a lot of people thought that they were ―inherently a 
militant terrorist group using violence as their tool‖ (Solheim; Stokke, Interviews). But 
were they inherently and unchangeably violent? Some thought that they were not, that 
violence would only be the policy of choice as long as it made the most strategic 
sense, and that it would have been possible to transform them as discussed in the 
previous chapter. The LTTE leader Prabhakaran himself is supposed to have said that 
―the means can change, but the goal is firm‖, implying that a strategic move away 
from violence was possible (via Stokke, Interview, all emphases mine). Furthermore, 
some have argued that the spectrum of violence and politics is much more gradual and 
fine-grained than a dichotomous choice: 
Rejecting a dichotomy of violence and politics, we argue that the Tamil struggle, led 
today by the LTTE, is a political project pursued by both peaceful and military means 
with varying degrees of emphasis and intensity at any one time. Indeed both modes are 
pursued simultaneously, with one or the other to the fore. In considering conflict 
transformation, it should be borne in mind that the decision to prioritize one or other 
means of struggle is driven by strategic consideration and context rather than an 
inevitability stemming from some essential characteristic of the LTTE. (…) Similarly, 
transformation from a predominantly military to a mainly political strategy happens 
when the actor feels that the switch will enhance the possibility of achieving its goals, 
tactical or strategic (Nadarajah & Vimalarajah, 2008, pp. 13-14).  
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Although there has been much debate about this question without a definitive answer, 
in my analysis I find it more plausible that the LTTE had the potential to move away 
from violence, rather than not. History has shown us few examples of inherently 
violent entities. There were no crucial external constrains on their freedom of action to 
move away from violence as the proscribers wanted them to. Ultimately, the only 
constriction against the LTTE‘s freedom of choice would be their internal decision-
makers desire to prefer using violence.
4
 
 The next question then becomes whether the LTTE had an incentive to continue 
to use violence as their primary means, contrary to the threatheners‘ wishes? I find this 
a somewhat difficult question to answer, as the creation of the LTTE in the 1970‘s 
would surely have never been necessary if the Tamil people could address their 
grievances through peaceful means. As it happened, they felt violence was required to 
stake their claims. So when I answer this question, it is in the context of the fifth peace 
process, and whether or not they at this point would ideally have preferred to continue 
to use violence. The analysis in the extensive NORAD-report on the process indicates 
that ―peace was harder to manage than war‖ for both sides in the process (Goodhand, 
Klem, & Sørbø, 2011, pp. 27). It is also fair to say that the LTTE was primarily a 
militant organization. They had a political wing but this was mainly subordinated to 
the military core (Stokke, Interview). As we saw in the previous chapter the emphasis 
was on the need to transform the LTTE away from violence and towards peaceful 
means. I believe this emphasis would not have been necessary if the LTTE had altered 
their strategy easily, implying that violence was their policy of choice. On the other 
hand, the LTTE‘s willingness to engage in the peace process at all, and their unilateral 
cease-fires in the early stages, shows that acting through peaceful means was certainly 
not beyond them. They also claimed that ―disarmament was not out of the question 
(but was conditional on the implementation of a political solution)‖ (Nadarajah, 
Interview). 
                                                 
4
 This is not to say that the LTTE did not have reason to fear the external constraint of the GoSL‘s military build-
up and potential suppression of Tamils if the LTTE were to renounce violence. It is not a judgment on the 
rationality of using violence or not either. It just means that the LTTE had a free choice in continuing to use 
violence or not.   
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 Was the threat of proscription relevant? Was it possible for the LTTE to move 
away from violence, and did they have an incentive to continue to use violence? I find 
these questions hard to answer conclusively, as arguments can be made, and have been 
made, for different answers to both questions. The answer will always be partly 
subjective. Nevertheless, I believe it is a fair assessment to say that the LTTE had the 
potential to move away from violence, but that they probably would have preferred to 
end the conflict through military means if this would have been possible. Therefore the 
condition of relevance can be described as sufficiently fulfilled, although I 
acknowledge that this is no definitive answer. 
 
 Severity 6.2
The second condition is whether the threat is severe enough. This means that the target 
of the threat ―must prefer to comply with the threatener‘s demands, rather than to defy 
these demands and have the threat effectuated‖ (Hovi, 1998, pp. 14, his emphasis). So 
was the threat of the proscriptions or the promise of de-proscriptions severe enough to 
alter the LTTE‘s incentive structure and move away from violence? 
 As we saw in Chapters 2 and 3, the terrorist proscriptions work through both 
material and ideational means, which are somewhat equivalent to ‗access‘ and ‗trust‘ 
in Haspeslagh‘s framework. I now analyze the severity of these effects in turn. First I 
analyze the severity of the sanctions through the material effects they could have had 
on the LTTE‘s ability to function as an armed group. These material effects are mainly 
the curbing of financing and weapons procurement. 
The information I have gathered points towards the conclusion that the 
proscriptions had nearly no effect on the ability of the LTTE to raise funds. The LTTE 
―was a well-oiled machine at raising funds through their wide-spread diaspora, and the 
proscriptions did partially, but not to a significant degree impact this. Given this fact it 
became hard to alter their incentive-structure‖ (Hattrem, Interview). Furthermore Erik 
Solheim explains that it is his ―clear conviction that the proscriptions had very little 
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effect, as they were supposed to have on preventing financing and procuring weapons 
to the LTTE‖, and that this is ―extremely difficult to do without an enormous political 
will and effort‖ (Interview). Additionally he says that ―the problem with the lists is 
that they make this prevention of attaining funds and weapons possible, but it requires 
an incredible effort‖ (Solheim, Interview). Sutha Nadarajah even believes that the 
proscriptions are more likely to have increased fund-raising than decreased it, as he 
explains: ―When you close down the ability to do ordinary political activities in 
support of the Tamil freedom struggle… if you can‘t do that publicly and you want to 
contribute to the struggle, then you send money‖ (Interview). The proscriptions can be 
said to have had very little impact on the LTTE‘s ability to raise funds from the 
diaspora, which in 2001 was estimated at a whopping $450-500 million a year 
(Bullion, 2001, pp. 77). 
 But what about the impact of the proscriptions on weapons procurement? The 
proscriptions themselves seem to have had very little impact on this aspect. As 
explained: ―If they [the proscriptions] had really made it more difficult to procure 
weapons, that would have been good, but they did not‖ (Solheim, Interview). Several 
of my sources held this view: ―The proscriptions had no impact on the LTTE‘s ability 
to function militarily, for instance, in this period they upgraded their naval capacity 
with several new and powerful attack craft, increased their artillery strength, and even 
built a fledgling air-force‖ (Nadarajah, Interview). It is important to remember that in a 
conflict between two parties, everything is relative. So the analysis of the military 
level of the LTTE is always relative to the GoSL level, and the goal of the LTTE was 
to ―maintain parity with the GoSL; politically, developmentally, and militarily – by 
which I mean their ability to maintain the battlefield stalemate which underpinned the 
Cease-Fire Agreement, not, of course, absolute equivalence in troops and firepower‖ 
(Nadarajah, Interview). Most of my sources agree that the LTTE was not affected 
negatively militarily, but the GoSL invested heavily in their military, so the balance 
was tipped in their favor as the process went along. And the fact that the US and India 
helped the GoSL with intelligence had a large effect on preventing weapons going to 
the LTTE later in the process, but this was not a direct consequence of the 
proscriptions (Solheim, Interview). I have now examined the material effects of the 
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proscriptions on the LTTE‘s ability to raise funds and weapons, and the effects seem 
far from severe enough for Hovi‘s condition to be fulfilled. 
―[The proscriptions] did not necessarily limit the LTTE‘s military capability, 
but it certainly undermined the LTTE‘s international legitimacy and proclaimed 
political project of national liberation‖ (Stokke, 2010, pp. 19). As Kristian Stokke 
argues, perhaps it was more on the ideational effects rather than the material ones that 
the proscriptions had their largest influence? As well as the military balance shifting 
from a status of parity in the early part of the process towards tipping more and more 
in the favor of the Sri Lankan government, the same can be said for the respective 
international legitimacy of the GoSL and the LTTE. This picture is confirmed by all 
my sources. The proscriptions had a limited impact on the military balance shifting, 
but it appears they had a larger effect on the ideational balance between the two parties 
in the conflict. Some certainly think so: Sutha Nadarajah believes that ―the 
legitimization effect from the proscriptions handed wholesale the advantage to the 
government‖ (Interview). It should not be forgotten that one of the five stated goals of 
the US FTO list is to ―stigmatize and isolate designated terrorist organizations 
internationally‖ (―Foreign Terrorist Organizations,‖ 2012). And it happened to be that 
the ―main argument for people not to talk with the LTTE was that it would give them 
legitimacy, with the proscriptions as the basis for this in the background‖ (Solheim, 
Interview).  
This must have been harmful for the LTTE, because at the early stages of the 
peace process the ―LTTE had a clear idea that they needed to engage the international 
community to start making their case for self-rule‖, and ―the LTTE were primarily 
interested in [internationalization of the process for its] political impacts‖ (Nadarajah, 
Interview) (Goodhand et al., 2011, pp. 72). And the proscriptions‘ impact on the 
question of legitimacy seems stronger than the impact they had on the material effects. 
In the words of Tore Hattrem: ―The proscriptions had limited material effect, but the 
LTTE‘s fight against it became a part of the struggle for legitimacy‖ (Interview). A 
similar argument is explained by Kristian Stokke: ―The contest was about legitimacy, 
and the government side managed to win this contest; it is in this context that the 
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proscriptions must be understood‖ (Interview). This contest of legitimacy was also 
very much in play with the national proscription, which ―the LTTE had to demand [to 
be taken off] for [continued] popular support from the Tamils‖ (Nadarajah, Interview).   
The proscriptions seem to have had a limited effect on the material, but a quite 
strong effect on the ideational. Does this mean the proscriptions fulfill the condition of 
severity? By my analysis they partly fulfill the condition, as the impact on the 
ideational aspect was significant and hurt the LTTE‘s position and parity in the peace 
process, but the material consequences were very limited. The proscriptions were 
clearly not severe enough for this condition alone to be decisive, so the condition of 
severity should thus be examined in concord with the other four at the end of the 
analysis, to fully understand the effectiveness of the proscriptions as a threat against 
the LTTE.  
 It is worth pointing out a pernicious effect that the proscriptions can have, and 
seem to have had to some degree in the case of the LTTE. When the proscriptions 
decrease the legitimacy of the group, but do not decrease their ability to procure arms, 
what is left is a situation of an armed group with little legitimacy and much weaponry. 
This is clearly not a constructive situation for achieving a constructive peace process 
but can instead lead to an armed group that only sees illegitimate violence as the 
means for reaching their goals.  
 
 Credibility 6.3
The next condition that needs to be fulfilled for the threat to be effective is credibility. 
In my case, the question is: did the LTTE believe that the proscriptions and their 
sanctions would be carried out if they continued to use violence and terrorist attacks? I 
will firstly analyze this through two lenses, which are the LTTE‘s perceptions of the 
proscribers‘ ‗capabilities‘ and ‗preferences‘. The first is the capabilities of the 
proscribing actors. What did the LTTE believe they were capable of in terms of 
proscriptions and their subsequent sanctions? I believe this question is fairly easy to 
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answer. Although I am not privy to the inner thoughts of the deceased Prabhakaran, it 
would surprise me if he was not fully aware of the extremely powerful potential 
capabilities actors such as the US and the EU have concerning anti-terrorism means. I 
will take this as given. 
The actual acts of proscription themselves, though, seem to have been credible 
(when analyzed separately from the sanctions deriving from the proscriptions), as the 
international community had shown a willingness to use proscriptions as a tool. The 
LTTE should not have been surprised when the EU proscribed them after their 
assassination of the Sri Lankan foreign minister Kadirgamar in 2005, they had been 
told a long time that ―these sort of killings needed to stop‖ if they wanted to be de-
proscribed or avoid further ones (Solheim, Interview). But to what degree the LTTE 
believed that the sanctions coming from the proscriptions would hurt them is more 
nuanced and more difficult to answer. The negative ideational effect of the 
proscriptions was genuine, but the material implications were probably felt less 
tangibly and this could have lessened the credibility of the international sanctions 
against the LTTE. It helps to fulfill the condition of credibility that the act of 
proscribing in itself is credible, but the consequences of the proscription must be 
credible as well for achieving full effect. 
Therefore a more interesting question concerns the LTTE‘s perception of these 
actors‘ preferences when it came to using the anti-terrorism means that the 
proscriptions allowed for. This question is interesting as ―the proscriptions create a 
legal basis for action, but nothing happens automatically as a consequence of this‖ 
(Solheim, Interview). As I learned previously, the international actors‘ capability of 
stopping funds and arms to the LTTE could only be realized by an incredible effort. As 
―Sri Lanka was never very central internationally‖, the efforts to impose the sanctions 
on fund-raising and arms procurement never seem to have come even close to the level 
of effort against a group like Al-Qaeda (Solheim, Interview). The US had and has a 
high general anti-terrorism interest, but the Tamil diaspora used for fund-raising is 
mainly localized in other Western countries, making policing of it more difficult and 
less pressing for the US. The EU proscription was similarly expected to yield modest 
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results on these issues: ―Attachment of LTTE assets and funds may not be so 
substantive as a measure at this juncture, however, because it is very likely that the 
LTTE, apprehending a ban, has already diverted its resources towards 'safe' and 
untraceable destinations‖ (Mukhopadhyay, 2006). The result was that ―barely any 
Tamils were convicted for anything in Europe‖ (Solheim, Interview). So it can, and 
has been, said that the willingness of the international actors to use these measures was 
limited, when they actually required enormous effort to realize the potential capability.  
For the sanctions of the international actors to have been credible, the LTTE 
must have believed that the international actors had the incentive and political will to 
implement these sanctions in a forceful manner. As the Sri Lankan conflict was never 
very central in the West, and did not pose a real national security threat to the 
international actors, these actors did not have a strong incentive to implement the 
sanctions powerfully. Analyzing this as a rational choice, a tough implementation of 
the sanctions would likely have had a high cost for the international actors, with only a 
modest gain in return. This analysis seems especially appropriate at a time when the 
Western actors had high costs due to national security measures and external wars in 
the Middle East. So it can, and has been said, that the willingness of the international 
actors to use these measures was limited, when they actually required enormous effort 
to realize their potential capability. For the GoSL on the other hand, the conflict was 
the most pressing issue for the country so their incentive was very high. This is an 
analysis the LTTE are likely to have made at the time, and it is therefore reasonable 
that they perceived the credibility of the threats of international sanctions as limited. 
To conclude the discussion: the credibility of the threats and promises of the acts of 
proscription themselves appear high, but for the threat of the sanctions deriving from 
the proscriptions the credibility seems more modestly fulfilled.   
 
 Completeness 6.4
The fourth condition for a threat to be effective is that it must be complete. In my case 
this means that the LTTE must have believed that if they complied with the 
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proscribers‘ demands, then they would be de-proscribed. Was this the situation on Sri 
Lanka? To this question there seems to be different answers for the different lists. 
Therefore I begin by analyzing the list from which the LTTE were in fact de-
proscribed, before examining the ones where they were not. 
On the national list of the Sri Lankan government the LTTE were de-proscribed 
on the September 6
th
 2002. This was after the explorative informal talks on the 
modalities for the peace process, but crucially before the formal talks, which began in 
Thailand two weeks later (Goodhand et al., 2011, pp. 39). The national de-proscription 
was ―crucial‖, and formal talks would not have been possible without it (Solheim, 
Interview). The Cease-Fire Agreement between the LTTE and the GoSL had been 
signed a few months earlier, the national de-proscription came as a result of the good-
will created by the CFA in addition to the promise from the LTTE to participate in 
formal talks on the condition of being de-proscribed. The LTTE on the other hand 
were privately assured by a Sri Lankan minister that they would be de-proscribed 
before the formal talks, and Balasingham and Prabhakaran believed this to be true to 
the extent that they advanced the process towards the formal talks (Balasingham, 2004, 
pp. 373-374). On Sri Lanka, the proscription and de-proscription of the LTTE was 
seen as ―a pragmatic instrument‖ (Stokke, Interview). It is clear that for the national 
list, the threat and promise of the proscription fulfill the condition of being complete. 
The LTTE complied with the necessary demands of the GoSL in the belief of being 
de-proscribed and became just that in time for it to be effective in advancing the peace 
process.  
The threats and promises from the international actors on the other hand, seem 
to have struggled with fulfilling this condition. This is evident when examining the 
behavior of the US officials. In a speech in Washington in February 2003, then-Deputy 
Secretary of State Richard Armitage said:  
If the LTTE can move beyond the terror tactics of the past and make a convincing case 
through its conduct and its actual actions that it is committed to a political solution and 
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to peace, the United States will certainly consider removing the LTTE from the list of 
Foreign Terrorist Organizations (in: Lunstead, 2007, pp. 16, my emphasis).  
This would seem like a text-book example of using the promise of de-proscription as a 
tool for affecting the strategic behavior of the LTTE and helping the peace process 
constructively: if you do this for us, we do this for you. But the key word in the 
statement is that the US will consider de-proscription. If the LTTE could not be certain 
of achieving de-proscription by changing their policies, then the promise from the US 
and the condition of completeness is fulfilled to a very limited degree. And when 
Richard Armitage began a process in the US State Department to find out what, in an 
optimistic scenario, it would take to de-proscribe the LTTE, he found out that: ―this 
was terribly difficult for the lawyers, and the US never returned with anything 
concerning this‖ (Helgesen, Interview). This difficulty of de-proscription has been a 
recurring issue for the US, perhaps most clearly in Nepal where it took the US four 
years after the Maoists‘ electoral victory and democratic rule to de-proscribe them.5 
The difficult nature of de-proscription in the US ―was especially true in the post-9/11 
period when anything that would have been seen as being ‗soft‘ on terrorists would 
have been a huge problem‖ (Jeffrey Lunstead, interview).  
In the US there are always someone protesting [de-proscription] and believes it is too 
early; there are questions in Congress et cetera. There are many institutions and 
therefore difficult to coordinate promises given with the implementation of them. The 
US‘s ability to deliver de-proscription without strong American interests being present 
is small. The proscriptions are easy to introduce with the stroke of a pen, but very 
difficult to reverse, therefore they are difficult to use as a tool (Solheim, Interview). 
Thus, the US proscription was far from complete in my view. If a conditional promise 
of de-proscription from the US was near impossible to actually implement, then it did 
not fulfill the condition of completeness. As ―the possible removal from the FTO-list 
                                                 
5
 Reference on the Maoists: (Department Of State. The Office of Website Management, 2012). Nelson Mandela 
and the ANC leadership were taken off a US terrorist watch list in 2008, further illustrating the, at times, curious 
difficulty of de-listing (―Mandela taken off US terror list,‖ 2008).  
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was to be the carrot [of the proscription mechanism]‖; the potentially positive effect of 
the promise of de-proscription would be very difficult to realize (Lunstead, interview).  
 But perhaps the UK‘s proscription can be said to have been complete? It is 
telling that ―the LTTE was told by UK security services the ban was coming three to 
four months before it actually happened‖ (Nadarajah, Interview). The Foreign Minister 
of Sri Lanka, Lakshman Kadirgamar also expressed the view that the UK was close to 
proscribing the LTTE months before it actually did (in: Uyangoda, 2006, pp. 246). 
Even more interesting is the fact that it was in this window of time between it was 
known that the UK would proscribe and it was actually implemented, that the LTTE 
instigated their month-long unilateral cease-fire in December 2000 (Goodhand et al., 
2011, pp. 33). According to Sutha Nadarajah, this ―demonstrated that the UK was not 
interested in what the LTTE were doing [at the time], but what they have done [in the 
past]‖ (Interview). As the decision to proscribe was already made and could not be 
affected by an arguably constructive move towards peace by the LTTE, then the 
conditionality of the proscription seems weak at best. 
Additionally, this leaked diplomatic cable from US ambassador Ashley Wills 
reveals that the UK, like the US, might have had issues with implementing a de-
proscription: ―It appears that HMG [UK Government] is a bit uncertain, as are we, 
about the methodology to be used in pushing a move to de-proscribe through its 
bureaucracy‖ (Wills, 2003). The UK‘s decision not to amend their plans of proscribing 
the LTTE after their cease-fire and their potential difficulties in pushing through a de-
proscription, indicate the point that the UK proscription did not fulfill the condition of 
being complete, at least in the early parts of the process. 
In my analysis the Sri Lankan national list functioned well as a pragmatic tool 
in the process and can be said to have fulfilled the condition of being complete. The 
proscriptions of the US and the UK seem to have been lacking this condition, which 
would make it more difficult to use their proscriptions as an effective tool. If the LTTE 
did not believe that a change in policy could achieve de-proscription, then the promise 
of de-proscription would never be an operative instrument. This, I believe, is indicated 
by the statement that ―the de-legitimization internationally [through the proscriptions], 
76 
 
I think, was something the LTTE took for granted as it [de-proscription] would not 
happen‖ (Nadarajah, Interview, my emphasis).  
 
 Clarity 6.5
The fifth and final condition that should be fulfilled for a threat to be effective is for 
the threat to be clear. This means that the LTTE must have understood what the 
proscribers wanted from them in order to either not proscribe the LTTE in the first 
place or to de-proscribe them. This must have been clear to the LTTE for the condition 
to be sufficiently fulfilled. So were the messages to the LTTE clear during the peace 
process? This extract from then-US ambassador to Sri Lanka Jeffrey Lunstead offers 
an illuminating view on the US officials‘ reflections on precisely this question of 
clarity:    
While the U.S. maintained this hard line, it tried to communicate, at several levels and 
both publicly and privately, that a change in LTTE behavior could lead to a change in 
the U.S. approach. This message was sent through the Norwegians in their facilitator 
role. It was also made repeatedly to various contacts who could pass it on to the LTTE. 
These contacts took place both in Sri Lanka, through prominent Tamil politicians; and 
in the U.S., through Tamil expatriates who were known to have close connections to 
the LTTE. On the public side, the U.S. both praised the LTTE for entering the peace 
process and held out the possibility of de-listing. … There is always a question, of 
course, as to whether the LTTE senior leadership, and especially LTTE Chief 
Prabhakaran, received this message and believed it. This is impossible to ascertain. 
What should be clear is that the U.S. made strenuous efforts to see that the message 
got through (Lunstead, 2007, pp. 16). 
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The Americans were ―very clear on what it would take [to be de-proscribed]‖ in their 
public statements, and this was also ―communicated indirectly via the Norwegians all 
the time‖ (Hattrem; Solheim, Interviews). But Erik Solheim believes ―it would have 
been a whole other dynamic if it had come from the Americans directly, rather than 
through these filters‖ (Interview, my emphasis). This last view from Solheim of the 
negative filtering of the communications, along with Lunstead‘s point that it is 
impossible to ascertain for sure whether the messages from the US were received and 
believed, cast some doubt on whether the US proscription was clear enough. But, in 
my general analysis and through interviewing then-LTTE press liaison Sutha 
Nadarajah, it seems to me that the US proscription should be considered to have been 
clear. If not perfectly so, then at least to some extent. Theses issues surrounding the 
difficulty of clarity here is similar to that of access in Haspeslagh‘s framework used in 
the previous chapter. This shows another way in which these two theoretical 
contributions can help illuminate each other. 
 The other international proscribers also made similar public statements. For 
instance there is this one, mentioned earlier in the chapter, by the British Foreign 
Office Minister at the time Mike O‘Brien: ―Before the proscription of the LTTE in the 
UK could be reconsidered by the British government, the LTTE would have to 
demonstrate a complete and convincing renunciation of terrorism‖ (―LTTE has to 
demonstrate complete and convincing renunciation of terrorism to lift ban — UK 
govt.,‖ 2002). In addition to this, the UK officials were in general much more open 
and flexible about meeting the LTTE, especially Balasingham, who they met in his 
home in London. So it is very plausible that the communication about what it would 
take for the UK to de-proscribe was more direct and clear than with the Americans, 
who were fastidious about the rules of contact with the LTTE (Nadarajah, interview).  
 As I learned during my research of the previous condition, the Sri Lankan 
government communicated clearly and completely in private conversation with Anton 
Balasingham what it would take to achieve de-proscription. Therefore, in my analysis, 
the clarity of the proscriptions as a whole can be said to have been fulfilled to a 
sufficient degree, with the Sri Lankan and UK proscriptions scoring somewhat better 
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than the American one. The LTTE in all probability received the messages about what 
it would take to be de-proscribed and understood them to a reasonable degree, 
although for instance a more direct communication with the US could have achieved 
even more under this condition, making the threats and promises perhaps more 
effective.  
 
 The Effectiveness of the Proscriptions 6.6
In this final section of the chapter I attempt to synthesize my analysis of the five 
conditions Jon Hovi deems necessary. To what degree can the conditions be said to 
have been fulfilled and the threats and promises against the LTTE to have been 
effective? All the conditions have been fulfilled to a certain extent, but none perfectly. 
The conditions that have been fulfilled the most seem to be the relevance and clarity of 
the proscriptions, meaning the LTTE had the necessary freedom of action to change 
their policy as well as having an incentive not to do so, and that the steps that were 
necessary for appeasing the proscribers were known to the LTTE. The weaknesses of 
the proscriptions appear to be the limited material impact they had on the LTTE‘s 
fundraising and weapons procurement and the difficulties the international actors 
would have had in implementing the de-proscriptions at home. These weaknesses 
made it difficult to hurt the LTTE sufficiently enough to alter their incentive-structure 
and impaired the international actors‘ ability to give conditional promises of de-
proscription in return for policy changes in the LTTE. 
 The threats and promises associated with the Sri Lankan national proscription 
generally fulfill the five conditions better than the international proscriptions, and it is 
therefore no surprise that the Sri Lankan government seemingly achieved more than 
the international actors. The GoSL had a more limited goal they wanted to achieve 
than the international actors, but in return they reached their goal of getting the LTTE 
to the table of formal talks in Thailand. Thus the Sri Lankan proscription and 
subsequent de-proscription were effective in getting the LTTE to the formal 
negotiation table, but the international proscriptions were ineffective in moving the 
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LTTE away from violent and terrorist means. Although this was a very difficult goal 
to achieve for the international actors, if the threats and promises of proscription and 
de-proscription had fulfilled the five conditions better, their probability of 
effectiveness would likely have increased. 
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7 Conclusion 
The aim for my thesis has been to analyze the impact terrorist proscriptions of the 
LTTE had on the 5
th
 Sri Lankan peace process, and to what degree this impact could 
help explain the failure of the process. I begin this chapter by summarizing my 
findings and answering my research question: To what degree can the impact of the 
terrorist proscriptions of the LTTE help explain the failure of the 5
th
 peace process in 
Sri Lanka? Then I reflect upon to what extent this is important knowledge in a wider 
sense, beyond the empirical limits of the Sri Lankan case. The last part of the chapter 
is dedicated to four lessons I believe should be drawn from my analysis, lessons by 
which terrorist proscriptions could be used in a more constructive manner in the future. 
  In my thesis I have used a combined analytical approach consisting of two 
theories, one by Sophie Haspeslagh and one by Jon Hovi. The former is focused on the 
impact of proscriptions on the framework of peace processes and the constraints the 
proscriptions place on third-parties, and the latter on the necessary conditions that need 
to be fulfilled for a threat or a promise (here of proscription or de-proscription) to be 
effective. In what ways did the proscriptions impact the peace process on Sri Lanka, 
and if they did, why is this important? 
 Let me begin with the findings I discovered using the framework created by 
Sophie Haspeslagh. She argues that proscriptions negatively affect the variables of 
access and trust between actors in a peace process, which in turn constrain the ability 
of third-parties to play four roles that are important for influencing a peace process 
positively. This constriction lessens the chances of concluding the process with a 
peace agreement. As I examined the variables of access and trust, these seem to have 
been affected negatively by the proscriptions. The access between many of the 
important actors was reduced due to the proscriptions‘ isolating mechanisms and the 
levels of trust between the actors were impacted negatively by the discursive and 
symbolic effect of the proscriptions and the associated branding of the LTTE as 
terrorists. 
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My analysis indicates that the impact of the proscriptions on the roles of 
understanding the LTTE and training the LTTE in conflict resolution had a minor 
negative impact on the process. The impact on the roles of influencing the LTTE and 
affecting their strategic calculations on the other hand seems to have had a strong 
negative impact on the peace process and the possibilities for reaching a peace 
agreement. The limited access and trust between important international actors and the 
LTTE, made it very difficult to influence the LTTE‘s decision making and guide their 
potential path towards a transformation into a peaceful actor. More specifically, the 
proscriptions had the effect of reducing the access particularly to the military 
leadership of the LTTE. These are the men whom the international community needed 
to engage and influence. To accomplish this would have been crucial for the process to 
end successfully in the long term. Whether this would have happened without the 
proscriptions is impossible to say, but it is likely that the chances for it to happen 
would have increased. The proscriptions‘ impact on the trust variable appears to have 
affected the chances for a peace agreement directly, while the impact on the access 
variable affected the chances for a peace agreement indirectly through its impact on 
the four roles. Therefore I conclude that it appears the proscriptions had a negative 
impact on the peace process in these regards.  
The second theoretical framework I used was Jon Hovi‘s theory on the 
conditions that are necessary for a threat or a promise to be effective. I used this 
framework in regards to the threat of proscription and promise of de-proscription. My 
analysis indicated that the conditions were fulfilled to different degrees by the different 
actors‘ threats and promises, and the government of Sri Lanka was the only actor to 
achieve something tangible by having an effect on the LTTE‘s decision to join the 
formal talks. This was due to the ideational importance the LTTE placed on their 
potential de-proscription from this list, thus fulfilling the condition of severity. In 
addition the GoSL gave the LTTE a clear and complete promise to de-proscribe them 
if the LTTE joined the formal talks, thus showing pragmatism in their use of the 
proscription as a dynamic tool.  
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The threats and promises of the international actors were not effective enough 
in their goal of altering the LTTE‘s incentive-structure in favor of a peaceful and 
transformative path. Especially the conditions of severity and completeness seem not 
to have been fulfilled to a sufficient degree. This was due to the material impact of the 
proscriptions being relatively modest, and the difficulties of implementing de-
proscription domestically making it very hard for the international actors to use the 
promise of de-proscription as a conditional carrot to alter the LTTE‘s incentive-
structure. This moderate but not sufficient fulfillment of the five conditions stipulated 
by Hovi can help explain the ineffectiveness of the threats and promises of 
proscription and de-proscription to have a positive impact on the 5
th
 Sri Lankan peace 
process. The three conditions in Hovi‘s theory that appear to have been most crucial 
for the possibility of influencing the LTTE were severity, completeness and clarity. 
This indicates that the most effective way the proscriptions can be used to alter a 
group‘s incentive-structure is a clearly communicated and believable promise to be 
taken off a list that severely hurts the group. My analysis indicates that the 
proscriptions failed to have a positive impact through its surrounding threats and 
promises; whilst the proscriptions had a negative impact as I analyzed it through 
Haspeslagh‘s framework. Thus, my analysis points to the inference that the impact of 
the proscriptions helps to explain the failure of the peace process.  
Aviation safety experts have realized for some time that aircraft incidents and 
accidents almost always result from a series of events, each of which is associated 
with one or more cause factors. Thus, the cause of an accident or incident has many 
aspects (National Research Council, 1998). 
In my view one could exchange these words from being related to aviation to being 
related to peace processes, and thus have a good description on how to conceive of the 
failure of peace processes such as the one on Sri Lanka. The failure of a process is 
seldom caused by one isolated cause or incident, but it is most to likely occur as a 
series of events and decisions that lead to a negative spiral that can be extremely hard 
to reverse. The impact of the proscriptions should be understood in light of this notion. 
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They were not the sole cause of the failure of the peace process, but they had a 
negative impact that in concord with other events and decisions created a track 
towards failure that would have been very difficult to change.  
 The proscriptions had an impact on the case of the Sri Lankan peace process, 
but are there any lessons that can be drawn to a wider scope? As discussed in chapter 
4, the research design for my thesis is not especially suited for generalizations. Its 
strengths lie with internal validity rather than with external validity. Regardless of this, 
there might be some knowledge that can be extrapolated from the analysis of the case 
to a bigger picture. I began the thesis by introducing powerful events and forces on the 
world stage, before narrowing my analytic scope down to a single case. Now I must 
pull the scope back and see what can be brought back with me from my analysis of the 
case of Sri Lanka.  
 It is easy to argue for the importance of understanding the proscriptions effect 
in Sri Lanka: the civilian death toll in the last few months of the conflict alone is 
thought to ―exceed 30,000‖, and therefore anything that could have prevented such an 
end in favor of a peaceful solution is of critical importance (International Crisis Group, 
2010). The thought that such a situation could arise again in another conflict should 
enforce the notion that more knowledge surrounding the consequences of the use of 
terrorist proscriptions is vital. If my findings should be considered together with the 
heightened awareness and knowledge on this subject over the last few years, there are 
four lessons I would want to emphasize.  
 Firstly, much more care should be taken with the initial decision to proscribe an 
organization or armed group. Politicians and government officials are quick to take 
actions of high symbolic value, thus showing the public and their allies they are doing 
something. But there should be much more consideration regarding what this 
something is, and whether or not it is constructive. As I have learned, the act of 
proscribing could have negative consequences that outweigh any positive impact. It is 
likely that not proscribing or delaying the proscription conditionally would be more 
effective, especially in a situation of an ongoing peace process. Thus the first lesson is 
to resist the urge to do something just for the sake of doing it. Any decision to 
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proscribe should be taken with much care and with a clear strategy for obtaining 
previously set goals.  
 Secondly, once proscriptions are in place there should be more differentiation 
and flexibility in their use. As I learned in chapter 2, proscription is in the main a 
blanket device that is supposed to give equal treatment to all proscribed groups. But 
there are obvious differences between for example Al-Qaeda and the LTTE, where the 
latter is engaged in a formal peace process. There should also be a corresponding 
differentiation and flexibility concerning the way the proscriptions are used in action. 
For instance, not allowing access between the proscriber‘s own government officials 
and the leaders of an armed group does not seem to be constructive. Therefore an 
option to suspend this denial of access should be put in place to be used under 
appropriate circumstances. If my analysis of the impact of the proscriptions in Sri 
Lanka is correct, the permitting of access could be important in other peace processes. 
This way the negative consequences for peace processes due to the proscriptions could 
be diminished. 
 Thirdly, the discourse around the term ‗terrorist‘ should be toned down, to make 
it easier to have a balanced approach towards armed groups that operate in a grey area 
between freedom fighters and terrorists. That could be a more constructive path for 
engaging these fighters, rather than automatically placing them in a category where 
they should only be talked with through bullets. This is something the Obama 
administration has already implemented with their near extinction of the term 
‗terrorist‘ from official statements.  
 Fourthly and lastly, there should be a stronger focus on the strategy and tactics 
of using the proscriptions as an active tool for reaching productive goals. Making the 
proscriptions more effective as mechanisms could be obtained by an increased 
attentiveness to the five conditions I analyzed in chapter 6. When the proscriptions are 
used, it should be with the goal of being effective in the threats and promises 
surrounding it, to accomplish strategic or tactical gains. For instance, by being severe 
enough to make warfare unsustainable for a proscribed group, or by giving a clear and 
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complete promise to de-proscribe the group if they agree to a set of terms that triggers 
a path towards peace.      
 In my thesis I have analyzed the impact of the terrorist proscriptions of the 
LTTE on the 5
th
 Sri Lankan peace process. What I found during my analysis has been 
presented throughout the thesis, and in this last chapter I have summarized my findings 
and discussed the part they should play when trying to understand why the peace 
process on Sri Lanka failed. This is the first ever comprehensive analysis of this 
impact; an analysis which in my mind was long overdue. Hopefully my discoveries 
can help increase the knowledge of this type of impact so it is less likely to occur in 
the future. Therefore, in this final part of the thesis I have aimed to pull back my scope 
and point out some lessons that could make terrorist proscriptions a more efficient and 
constructive tool in the future. In my view, with increased knowledge and a more 
considered use of the terrorist proscriptions they could potentially become an effective 
instrument of peace and therefore have positive effects on the lives of a great number 
of people.     
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Appendix 1: Respondents 
Name               Position of relevance Interview 
Kristian Stokke Professor at the Department of 
Sociology and Human 
Geography, University of Oslo  
Personal interview February 7
th 
2014
 
  
Tore Hattrem Former Norwegian Ambassador 
to Sri Lanka 
Personal interview February 
14
th
 2014 
Erik Solheim Former Special Advisor to the 
Norwegian Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs in Sri Lanka 
Personal interview in Paris 
February 20
th 
2014
 
 
Vidar Helgesen Former State Secretary of the 
Norwegian Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs 
Personal interview February 
25
th
 2014 
Sutha Nadarajah Former Press liaison to the 
LTTE negotiating delegation 
(2002-2003), and former Editor 
of the Tamil Guardian 
Skype interviews February 28
th
 
and March 2
nd
 2014  
Jon Westborg Former Norwegian Ambassador 
to Sri Lanka 
Personal interview March 28
th 
2014  
Jeffrey Lunstead Former US Ambassador to Sri 
Lanka 
E-mail correspondence April 7
th 
2014
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Appendix 2: Interview Guide 
In the interviews with Norwegians the questions were asked in Norwegian. All 
questions were not asked of every respondent, and follow-up questions that are not 
included here can have been asked. 
            Haspeslagh theory 
1. How did the terrorist proscriptions affect the access that different actors had to 
the LTTE, and which effect did this have on the peace process?  
2. How did the terrorist proscriptions affect the trust between the different actors 
and the LTTE, and which effect did this have on the peace process?  
3. If the levels of access and trust had been higher, do you believe this could have 
helped the process of transforming the LTTE into a peaceful, political party? 
4. Which effect did the proscriptions have on the legitimacy of the LTTE, and 
what part did the struggle for legitimacy play in the peace process? 
5. To what degree did the proscriptions affect the actors‘ in the peace process 
ability to understand each other?  
6. To what degree would you say the GoSL and the LTTE learned to read and 
interact with the international arena during the process? 
Hovi theory 
7. Which effect did the proscriptions have on the LTTE‘s ability to function as an 
armed group (financing, weapons, and recruitment)? 
8. Was it ever, to your knowledge, communicated to the LTTE what it would take 
for them to be de-proscribed?  
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9. Which purpose did the proscriptions have for the US and the other international 
actors, and did they have their intended effect? 
           Events 
10. How important was the Sri Lankan de-proscription in getting the LTTE to the 
negotiation table? How did the GoSL relate to the tool of proscription?  
11. In what way did 9/11 affect the situation on Sri Lanka?  
12. What kind of impact did the LTTE‘s exclusion from the donor conference in 
Washington DC have? 
13. What kind of impact did the EU‘s proscription in 2006 have on the SLMM and 
the process in general? 
14. What kind of impact did the increasingly multi-polar nature of the world have 
on the peace process? 
     General questions 
15. In your view, how did the proscriptions of the LTTE affect the process in 
general? 
16. In what way do you believe the process could have proceeded differently if the 
proscriptions had not taken place, if at all? 
17. Which lessons should policy-makers and practitioners draw from the way the 
proscriptions functioned on Sri Lanka?  
 
